Vulnerability to depression and cognitive bias modification by Chan, Stella
  
 
 
Vulnerability to Depression and Cognitive Bias Modification 
 
 
Wing Yan Stella Chan 
 
 
Word Count: 33,421 
 
First Submission: 31
st
 May, 2012 
Re-submission: 4
th
 October, 2012 
 
 
Thesis submitted for the Doctorate in Clinical Psychology 
Norwich Medical School 
Faculty of Medicine and Health Sciences 
University of East Anglia 
 
 
This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is 
understood to recognise that its copyright rests with the author and that use of any 
information derived there from must be in accordance with current UK Copyright 
Law. In addition, any quotation or extract must include full attribution. 
2 
 
Abstract 
Background and Aims. Cognitive Bias Modification (CBM) has been found to be 
effective in promoting positive interpretations and mood in adults, including those 
with symptoms of depression and anxiety. However, only four studies have been 
conducted in adolescent populations. This study therefore aimed to further 
investigate the effects of CBM in adolescents, including those who have higher risk 
for developing depression by virtue of neuroticism. Method. This study adopted a 
between-groups experimental design across three time points. Seventy-four 
adolescents aged 16 – 18 were randomised into receiving either two sessions of 
CBM or control intervention. Their interpretation bias and mood were measured at 
baseline, immediately post-training and one week afterwards. Stress vulnerability 
was assessed using a novel experimental stressor; participants were also asked to 
report their daily mood and stressful events over one week. Feedback was collected. 
Results. The CBM group showed a greater reduction in negative affect than the 
control. In addition, the CBM group did not show the increase in state anxiety as 
seen in control participants. However, CBM did not show superior benefits in other 
outcome measures. Both groups displayed an increase in positive interpretations, a 
decrease in negative interpretations, and a reduction in depressive symptoms. The 
two groups did not differ in their responses to stress. Participants with higher scores 
on neuroticism showed higher levels of negative interpretation bias, mood symptoms 
and stress vulnerability. However, there was no evidence to suggest that neuroticism 
acts as a moderator of training effects. Feedback from participants was mostly 
positive. Conclusion. Overall, this study has not yielded strong supportive evidence 
for the use of CBM in healthy or vulnerable adolescents. Despite methodological 
limitations, this study has broadened the evidence base of CBM in adolescent 
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populations. It also represents an important step in developing CBM as a preventive 
intervention for vulnerable adolescents. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
1.1 General Introduction 
Depression is a serious mood disorder that affects nearly all aspects of 
normal functioning, with the core features as persistent dysphoric mood and/ or 
anhedonia (i.e. inability to experience pleasure), which coexist with disturbances of 
motivated and psychomotor behaviour, sleep, appetite, energy and libido, and in 
some occasions suicide (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 4th 
edition; American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Sadly, depression is one of the 
most common mental health problems. According to figures published by the World 
Health Organisation (WHO, 2011), depression affects as many as 121 million people 
worldwide.  In a study specifically looking at prevalence rates within Europe 
(Ayuso-Mateos et al., 2001), the urban areas of the UK were reported to have the 
highest rate (17.1%), a figure nearly double the average rate in Europe (8.56%).  
Notably, substantially higher rates were seen in the urban than rural communities, 
and in women compared with men (10.05% vs. 6.61%) although men had higher 
completed suicidal rates (WHO, 2011; Williams, 2001). Not only does depression 
cause great distress to the individuals affected and their families, depression is also 
considered as one of the leading causes of disability. It is estimated that by 2020, 
depression will be the second highest contributor to the global disease burden due to 
the loss of workplace productivity, costs of treatment and other associated costs 
(WHO, 2011). 
The current mainstream treatments are antidepressant medications and 
psychological treatments, in particular Cognitive Behaviour Therapy (CBT). 
Treatments of ‘lower intensity’ such as computerised CBT, guided self-help, psycho-
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education, and physical exercise group are also recommended for individuals 
suffering from milder forms of depression (see guidelines from the National Institute 
for Health and Clinical Excellence; NICE, 2004). Recovery rates reported so far (see 
below) are around 50% at best, highlighting the fact that about half of the individuals 
still experience depressive symptoms that reach clinical diagnostic criteria by the end 
of their treatment. For example, a study based on the routine clinical practice in 32 
Improving Access to Psychological Therapies (IAPT) services in the UK reported a 
national average recovery rate of 42%, with considerable variability between 27% 
and 58% across sites (North East Public Health Observatory, 2010). These rates were 
consistent with the established efficacy of CBT in earlier studies (e.g., Clark & 
Ehlers, 1993; Shapiro et al., 1994). Similarly, recovery rates for antidepressants were 
reported as around 51% after publication bias was taken into account (Turner, 
Matthews, Linardatos, Tell, & Rosenthal, 2008).  
Not only does depression appear to be a condition which is difficult to treat, 
it is highly recurrent (64%) even in this modern age of maintenance medication 
(Yiend et al., 2009). It has been estimated that 30 - 50% of the individuals with 
depression will experience a relapse as soon as 4 – 6 months following treatment 
(Thase, 1999). On average, those who suffer from one depressive episode will 
experience four lifetime depressive episodes of 20 weeks duration each (Judd, 1997). 
Given this high relapse rate, the illness is now viewed as a chronic lifelong mental 
health condition. 
Taken together, depression affects a huge proportion of the population, is 
difficult to treat, and is highly recurrent. To add to the challenge, this battle often 
starts quite early in life, with more than 50% of individuals having their first 
depressive episode by the age of 25, and 25% by the age of 18 (Sorenson, Rutter, & 
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Aneshensel, 1991). Thus, it is absolutely vital that more research is done to further 
our understanding of risk mechanisms, with the ultimate aim to develop effective 
ways to prevent first onset of depression especially amongst vulnerable young 
people.  
Historically, research on vulnerability to depression has been focused on 
identifying risk factors through large scale twin studies (e.g., Kendler, Gardner, & 
Prescott, 2002, 2006a; Kendler & Prescott, 1999). More recently a range of cognitive 
mechanisms have been shown to be associated with some of these risk factors and 
thus may play a key role in contributing to the development of depression (see 
section 1.2 below for details). For example, students with a high score on 
neuroticism, a well-known personality risk factor, have been found to show 
widespread negative biases in emotional processing both in behavioural (Chan, 
Goodwin, & Harmer, 2007) and neuroimaging studies (Chan, Harmer, Goodwin, & 
Norbury, 2008a; Chan, Norbury, Goodwin, & Harmer, 2009), and a subset of these 
biases were shown to be predictive of depressive symptoms within 18 months (Chan, 
Goodwin, & Harmer, 2008b). 
These findings led to the hypothesis that the reversal of negative cognitive 
biases could reduce risk for depression. Indeed, a recently developed cognitive 
training programme known as Cognitive Bias Modification (CBM; Mathews & 
Mackintosh, 2000) has been shown to be effective in reversing negative 
interpretation biases and promoting positive mood. Although a large proportion of 
the studies have been done with healthy adult participants, there is increasing 
evidence that CBM could be adapted for use with individuals suffering from 
emotional disorders including anxiety and depression, as well as across a wider age 
range (see section 1.3 below for details).  
15 
 
Therefore, this thesis investigation aimed to study the effects of CBM on the 
cognitive style, mood, and emotional vulnerability in adolescents including those 
who have a high risk for developing depression by virtue of neuroticism. A novel 
paradigm was designed and piloted specifically in this study to measure the cognitive 
and emotional responses to an experimentally induced stressor. Both qualitative and 
quantitative feedback was collected from the participants to establish the feasibility 
and acceptability of this training programme. As noted earlier, this line of research 
will provide the prerequisite for developing effective strategies for preventing 
depression. 
 First, this introductory chapter aims to provide an overview and critical 
evaluation of the existing literature regarding vulnerability to depression (section 
1.2) and the development of the Cognitive Bias Modification paradigm (section 1.3). 
Specifically, Section 1.2 will provide an outline of neuroticism and other risk factors 
identified by twin studies (section 1.2.1) as well as the cognitive mechanisms 
thought to be underlying these risk factors (section 1.2.2). This will be followed by a 
description of a systematic literature review in Section 1.3, in which the evidence 
base for the CBM to be used with individuals with clinical or sub-clinical mood 
disorders will be critically evaluated. This chapter will be concluded by outlining the 
objectives, hypotheses and methodology of this thesis investigation (section 1.4). 
 
1.2 Vulnerability to Depression 
To effectively prevent the first onset of depression, we need a thorough 
understanding of the aetiology of the illness. So far, research has identified the key 
high risk factors as family history of psychiatric illnesses, childhood abuse / neglect 
and the personality trait of neuroticism. These factors are believed to increase 
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depression when triggered by major stressful life events (see section 1.2.1 below). 
These research studies convincingly demonstrate factors involved in risk for 
depression.  However, they do not inform us of the exact mechanisms whereby these 
high risk factors lead to depression. 
 In contrast, cognitive and biological theories of depression suggest 
mechanisms without necessarily the same emphasis on a coherent causal model. 
Specifically, cognitive theories emphasise the role of negative biases in information 
processing in the aetiology and maintenance of depression (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & 
Emery, 1979). In support of this, selective attention, interpretation and memory for 
negative materials have been reported in depressed patients and to a certain extent 
those who are at risk for depression and those who have recovered from it (Williams, 
Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997; see section 1.2.2 below).  
 Both of the research approaches above are important in further our 
understanding of the development of vulnerability to depression, and will be 
considered in further details in the following subsections. 
 
1.2.1 Neuroticism and other risk factors for depression 
The aetiology of depression in community samples has been intensively 
investigated in twin studies that can broadly distinguish genetic from environmental 
factors. Kendler’s group has published an unparalleled account of the risk factors 
together with a comprehensive model of how they may be related. In a very broad 
outline, the key vulnerability factors appear to be neuroticism, family history of 
depression and early abuse / neglect or trauma, whereas the precipitating factors are 
adverse life events and difficulties. Working with these variables, episodes of major 
depression are moderately well predicted at 12 month follow up both in women 
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(Kendler et al., 2002) and men (Kendler et al., 2006a), although childhood parental 
loss and low self-esteem appeared to be more potent variables in the model of men 
than in women. 
 Amongst all, neuroticism is one of the most documented predictors for 
depression. Neuroticism is a major personality dimension measuring an individual’s 
tendency to experience negative emotions (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1964; John, 1990). 
This personality trait is stable over adulthood (McCrae & Costa, 1990), and has a 
heritability of approximately 50% (Eysenck, 1990). High levels are associated with 
risk for depression when measured both cross-sectionally and prospectively. 
Specifically, in a large sample of female twins, one standard deviation difference in 
neuroticism was found to translate into a 100% difference in the rate of first onsets 
of depression over 12 months (Kendler, Kessler, Neale, Heath, & Eaves, 1993). 
Similarly, in a report based on a large Swedish twin sample (> 20,000 individuals; 
Kendler, Gatz, Gardner, & Pedersen, 2006b), neuroticism strongly predicted the 
risks for lifetime and first onset depression assessed in 25 year follow up. Although 
extraversion was also (inversely) correlated with depression in this sample, this was 
mediated by the correlation between neuroticism and extraversion; thus the overall 
results identified neuroticism as the exclusive personality risk factor for depression. 
Furthermore, the twin modelling conducted in these studies suggested that the 
association between neuroticism and risk for depression is largely due to shared 
genetic determinants. 
 Indeed, family inheritance has been defined as a reliable risk factor for 
depression. It has been estimated that by young adulthood up to 40% of the offspring 
of parents with a clinical mood disorder will have suffered a personal episode of 
depression (Beardslee, Verage, & Gladstone, 1998; Gotlib & Goodman, 1999; 
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Weissman, Fendrich, Warner, & Wickramaratne, 1992) or other forms of 
psychopathology (Weissman et al., 2006), which appears to be partially transmitted 
by genetic factors (Sullivan, Neale, & Kendler, 2000). Based on a large twin sample 
containing more than 3000 same-sex and different-sex twins, Kendler and Prescott 
(1999) estimated the heritability of liability to depression as 39%, which is similar 
for men and women, while individual-specific environment accounts for the 
remaining 61% of variance.  
 Clearly, environmental factors also play a crucial role in the aetiology of 
depression.  The social origins of depression have been extensively investigated 
(Brown & Harris, 1978) and it has been suggested that depression is more common 
amongst those from the lower social classes (Murphy, 1982). The higher rates of 
depression within the lower social classes were in part due to their lack of social 
support and higher exposure to life stress (Brown & Harris, 1978; Dennis, 
Wakefield, Molly, Andrews & Friedman, 2005; Murphy, 1982). Indeed, there has 
been growing evidence that depression is often preceded by stressful life events 
(Hammen, 1991; Kendler, Karkowski, & Prescott, 1999; Kendler, Kuhn, & Prescott, 
2004; Simons, Angell, Monroe, & Thase, 1993).  
Amongst all, the link between childhood trauma and mood disorders later in 
life has long been acknowledged (Cicchetti & Toth, 1995; Post, Weiss, & Leverich, 
1994). Childhood abuse or neglect was shown to have a strong negative impact on 
the social, emotional, behavioural, and cognitive development of children (Erickson 
& Egeland, 1996; Kaler & Freeman, 1994; Rogosch, Cicchetti, & Aber, 1995). 
Although historically considered as an ‘environmental’ factor, childhood abuse or 
neglect has been shown to have a direct impact on the neurobiological development 
in the early years, resulting in structural and functional differences in the brain that 
19 
 
will affect the fundamental way in which we process information and regulate 
emotion (Glaser, 2000; van der Kolk, 2003). 
Nevertheless, many people who experience similar environmental stressors 
or early trauma do not develop depression (Kendell-Tackett, Williams, & Finkelhor, 
1993). This realization is consistent with the diathesis-stress model, which states that 
depression is caused by a genetic vulnerability combined with the experience of 
stressful life events. In support for this, Caspi and colleagues (2003) found that a 
polymorphism in the 5-HT transporter gene interacts with stressful life events to 
predict depression. Neuroticism, as a genetically-mediated risk factor, has also been 
found to interact with adverse life events, such that individuals with a high neurotic 
trait are more sensitive to the depressogenic effects of adversity (Kendler et al., 
2004).  
Overall, research suggests that individuals who are genetically predisposed to 
depression are most likely to develop depression in the face of major stressful life 
events. While the above findings are robust and convincing, the approach is 
essentially observational. In addition, most of the risk factors identified above, such 
as family history and personality trait, are difficult to reverse or prevent. As such, 
prevention of depression requires more than simply knowing the risk factors. Indeed, 
it is important to draw upon the neurocognitive theories to fully understand the 
complexity of vulnerability to depression. One of the key advantages is that, whereas 
risk factors are relatively inalterable, the underlying neurocognitive mechanisms may 
be more modifiable. 
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1.2.2 Cognitive mechanisms underlying risk for depression 
As noted above, the current thesis investigation aimed to test the hypothesis 
that vulnerability to depression could be reduced through modifying negative 
cognitive biases. This hypothesis was built upon research evidence that suggests 
cognitive biases as a stable vulnerability marker for depression. This subsection aims 
to outline, and critically evaluate, the theoretical debate and clinical implications 
around these research findings. 
 
1.2.2.1 Cognitive biases in depression 
Cognitive theories of depression emphasise the role of negative biases in 
information processing in the aetiology and maintenance of the disorder. 
Specifically, Beck proposed that, in depression, there are dysfunctional schemas 
which contain information about loss and failure, and the activation of such schemas 
results in selective processing of schema-congruent information (Beck et al., 1979). 
In support of this, negative biases for memory and interpretation, and to a certain 
extent attention, have been robustly seen in individuals suffering from clinical or 
subclinical depression both in experimental studies and clinical observations. 
 Attention bias was historically considered as more relevant for anxiety than 
depression (Mathews, 1990; Williams et al., 1997). Indeed, an attention bias for 
threat has been robustly found in anxious individuals using the attentional probe 
tasks (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986; Mogg, Mathews, & Eysenck, 1992) or 
modified Stroop tasks (McNally, Reimann, & Kim, 1990; Mogg, Mathews, & 
Weinman, 1989). However, there has been emerging evidence that suggest a link 
between depression and attention bias when stimuli were more ‘depression-related’ 
and presented for a substantially longer period of time (Bradley, Mogg, & Lee, 1997; 
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Mathews, Ridgeway, & Williamson, 1996; Mogg, Bradley, & Williams, 1995). 
Based on these findings, it has been argued that depression is not associated with an 
attentional bias during the initial orientation as in anxiety (see MacLeod & 
Rutherford, 1992; Mogg et al., 1995), but instead may be characterized by the 
difficulty in disengaging attention from such materials. 
While the findings of attentional biases in depression are controversial, 
memory bias is regarded as a reliable marker of depression. Earlier studies on 
autobiographical memory found that more negative events were recalled by 
depressed patients (Lloyd & Lishman, 1975). Although these findings were initially 
criticized for being confounded by the fact that depressed patients may have more 
negative experiences in the first place, the evidence for memory bias in depression 
was strengthened by later experiments using standard word lists or stories (Denny & 
Hunt, 1992; Watkins, Mathews, Williamson, & Fuller, 1992). Furthermore, not only 
have depressed individuals shown a bias towards negative information when they 
were asked to deliberately recall it (‘explicit memory’), there has been increasing 
evidence arguing for the role of ‘implicit memory’ in depression using tasks such as 
the word stem completion task or lexical decision task (Bradley, Mogg, & Williams, 
1994, 1995; Watkins, Vache, Verney, & Mathews, 1996). Notably, these studies also 
showed that memory bias could occur without conscious awareness, highlighting the 
automatic nature of the negative biases underlying depression. 
Another cognitive marker for depression is negative interpretation bias, a 
tendency to interpret emotionally ambiguous information as more negative or less 
positive (Lawson, MacLeod, & Hammond, 2002). Earlier studies tended to use more 
explicit measures by, for example, asking individuals to report their interpretations 
of written ambiguous scenarios (Butler & Mathews, 1983; Cane & Gotlib, 1985; 
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Kavanagh & Bower, 1985). Although these studies yielded supportive evidence for 
the presence of interpretation biases in depression, they were criticized for being 
attributable to response biases (MacLeod & Mathews, 1991). Using more indirect 
measures (thus reducing the effect of the above confounding factor), depression has 
been associated with increased perception of sad faces (Bouhuys, Geerts, & Gordijn, 
1999; Hale, 1998; Matthews & Antes, 1992), reduced perception of happy faces 
(Sloan, Strauss, Quirk, & Sajatovic, 1997; Sloan, Strauss, & Wisner, 2001; Suslow, 
Junghanns, & Arolt, 2001), or both (Gur et al., 1992; Surguladze et al., 2004). Apart 
from biases towards negative facial expressions, depressed individuals have also 
been seen to make more negative interpretations using a homophone task (Mogg, 
Bradbury, & Bradley, 2006) and schema-relevant ambiguous events (Dohr, Rush, & 
Bernstein, 1989). Negative biases measured by the Scrambled Sentences Test were 
found to be predictive of depressive symptoms 4 – 6 weeks later, after controlling for 
current or past depression (Rude, Wenzlaff, Gibbs, Vane, & Whitney, 2002). 
Furthermore, depressed individuals were found to show larger eye-blink reflex 
responses to auditory ambiguous stimuli, suggesting that interpretation biases are 
mediated through a highly autonomous processing pathway (Lawson et al., 2002). It 
should be noted that, despite the abundant evidence for the presence of interpretation 
biases in depression, a minority of studies did not illustrate this effect (e.g., Lawson 
& MacLeod, 1999), presumably due to methodological differences (e.g., use of 
different outcome measures) in these studies. 
Interpretation bias is not an exclusive marker for depression. Indeed, negative 
interpretations have been widely implicated in social phobia (Amir, Foa, & Coles, 
1998; Hirsch & Mathews, 1997, 2000) and generalized anxiety disorder (Eysenck, 
MacLeod, & Mathews, 1987; Mogg et al., 1994), although it has been suggested that 
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interpretation bias may manifest in slightly different forms in depression and anxiety 
(Huppert, Foa, Furr, Filip, & Mathews, 2003). This tendency to repeatedly make 
negative interpretations is believed to have long term harmful effects on emotional 
state (Beck & Clark, 1991). 
Notably, negative biases discussed above appear to be particularly prominent 
when they were processed with reference to the self. This was seen in memory 
(Blaney, 1986; Mathews & MacLeod, 1994; Teasdale, 1988), attention (Segal, 
Gemar, Truchon, Guirguis, & Horowitz, 1995; Segal & Vella, 1990), interpretation 
of facial expressions (Bouhuys, Bloem, & Groothuis, 1995) and social situations 
(Hoehn-Hyde & Rush, 1982). These self-directed negative biases are thought to play 
a key role in sustaining the negative sense of self that characterizes the core 
depressive symptoms of shame, guilt, and self-blame (Tangney, 1993). 
  
1.2.2.2  State vs. trait characteristics of depression 
Hence, as reviewed above, depression is characterised by predominate 
negative biases. However, there has been a longstanding debate as to whether these 
are state or trait factors of depression, that is, whether they are correlates of current 
depressed mood or whether they are long term stable vulnerability markers 
preceding the onset of depression.  
Mood induction experiments provide one way to disentangle state and trait 
factors. Following negative mood induction, healthy volunteers were found to 
display increased attention to negative stimuli (Bradley et al., 1997; Gotlib & 
McCann, 1984), increased interpretation of sad relative to happy faces (Bouhuys et 
al., 1995), and increased memory for negative materials (Mathews & Bradley, 1983; 
Sutton, Teasdale, & Broadbent, 1988; Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979). These results 
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suggest that mood directly modulates emotional processing, thus rendering support 
for the ‘state’ hypothesis. Consistent with this, the evidence that negative biases 
disappear following successful treatment also suggests a mood-dependent 
characteristic (Gotlib & Cane, 1987; Mikhailova, Vladimirova, Iznak, 
Tsusulkovskaya, & Sushko, 1996).  
 By contrast, cognitive biases that persist following recovery give strong 
support for the trait hypothesis. In particular, residual biases have been found in 
recovered patients in the facial expression recognition tasks (Bhagwagar, Cowen, 
Goodwin, & Harmer, 2004; Hayward, Goodwin, Cowen, & Harmer, 2005), which 
could predict subsequent relapse within six months (Bouhuys et al., 1999).  
However, these studies could not rule out a scar effect, so-called because the residual 
biases may be a consequence of depression, rather than implying occurrence before 
the onset of the first episode.  
 As mentioned above, evidence that cognitive biases are present in vulnerable 
individuals prior to the onset of depression are particularly relevant for the current 
thesis investigation. Indeed, earlier studies have illustrated cognitive biases in high 
risk populations. For example, individuals with higher scores on neuroticism tend to 
recall more self-depreciatory adjectives (Young & Martin, 1981) and sentences with 
negative tones (Lishman, 1972). Similarly, neuroticism was found to be correlated 
with negative interpretations for ambiguous information (Salemink & van den Hout, 
2010). However, as neuroticism is often linked to dysphoric mood, it is again unclear 
as to the extent to which the cognitive biases observed are independent of mood 
states. In addition, most of these earlier studies on neuroticism were based on non-
selective community samples using correlational analyses that could not clarify 
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causation. Some of these findings were further compromised by poor control for 
previous experience of depression in their samples. 
 More recent publications have shed light into this state vs. trait debate by 
illustrating widespread emotional processing biases in vulnerable (high neuroticism 
scores) never-depressed individuals (Chan et al., 2007), and a subset of these biases 
was shown to be predictive of depressive symptoms within 18 months (Chan et al., 
2008b). Consistent with this, Alloy and colleagues (2006) recruited a sample of high 
risk vs. low risk college students by virtue of cognitive styles, and they found that 
depression was well predicted by these cognitive factors in a two and a half year 
follow-up. In addition, children of clinically depressed or anxious parents showed an 
attentional bias for negative words (Moradi, Neshat-Doost, Taghavi, Yule, & 
Dalgleish, 1999) and faces (Joormann, Talbot, & Gotlib, 2007; Pine et al., 2005), as 
well as a tendency to interpret ambiguous words and stories more negatively and / or 
less positively (Dearing & Gotlib, 2009). These findings are in line with the 
‘cognitive vulnerability hypothesis’ proposed by cognitive theories of depression 
(Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989; Beck, 1967).  
As a conclusion to the state vs. trait debate, although these studies cannot 
completely rule out the state effect, they nonetheless provide very strong evidence 
arguing for the existence of trait markers of depression. Specifically, they showed 
that cognitive biases exist as trait vulnerability markers preceding the onset of 
depression, thus raising the hypothesis that preventive measures targeting directly on 
cognitive biases could be helpful in reducing risk for depression. This hypothesis 
will be further discussed in the next section. 
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1.3 Cognitive Bias Modification: A Systematic Literature Review 
As discussed above, there has been robust empirical evidence to support the 
cognitive theories that depression and anxiety are associated with negative biases in 
information processing (Williams et al., 1997). Specifically, a tendency to interpret 
ambiguous situations negatively and / or a reduced tendency to make benign 
interpretations have been well documented in social phobia (Amir et al., 1998; 
Hirsch & Mathews, 1997, 2000), generalized anxiety disorder (Eysenck et al., 1987; 
Mogg et al., 1994), and depression (Butler & Mathews, 1983; Rude et al., 2002). 
This gave rise to the question of whether cognitive biases could be ‘modified’, and if 
so whether this could lead to changes in mood and emotional vulnerability associated 
with anxiety and depression. 
To test part of this hypothesis, Mathews and Mackintosh (2000) developed a 
task known as Cognitive Bias Modification (CBM) to examine whether 
interpretation biases could be modified through repeated practice with prompts and 
corrective feedback. Though originally designed as an experimental paradigm, it 
rapidly attracted intense interest for its potential clinical use for the prevention and 
treatment of depression and anxiety disorders. 
The evidence base for the clinical and subclincial use of CBM will be 
critically evaluated in this section through a systematic literature review. It will 
begin by outlining the development of CBM (section 1.3.1), followed by a 
description of the methods used in the systematic review (section 1.3.2), and finally 
the results generated and their theoretical and clinical implications (sections 1.3.3 – 
1.3.4).   
It should be noted that, in addition to interpretation biases, training paradigms 
have also been developed to target other information processing biases such as 
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attention (see Bar-Haim, 2010; Browning, Holmes, & Harmer, 2010; Hakamata et 
al., 2010 for a review) and memory (Joormann, Hertel, LeMoult, & Gotlib, 2009; 
Raes, Williams, & Hermans, 2009). The current study aimed to examine hypotheses 
in relation to interpretation biases, and as such the literature concerning attentional 
bias modification and other types of cognitive training programmes is beyond the 
scope of this review. 
 
1.3.1 Overview of CBM studies 
 In the first study on CBM (Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000), participants were 
asked to read descriptions of ambiguous social situations with the emotional 
outcome resolved only by the final word. This final word was presented in fragment 
form for participants to complete, who would then answer a question designed to 
reinforce the designated interpretation. ‘Positive training’ prompted benign / positive 
interpretations, whereas ‘negative training’ encouraged negative interpretations.  
An example of the training items is as follows: 
Your partner asks you to go to an anniversary dinner that their company is holding. 
You have not met any of their work colleagues before. Getting ready to go, you think 
that the new people you will meet will find you… 
The word fragment that followed was either bo- -ng (boring; negative 
training condition) or fri- - d- y (friendly; positive training condition). To reinforce 
the valenced meaning, the following comprehension question was asked: 
Will you be disliked by your new acquaintances? 
The correct answer was ‘Yes’ for the negative training condition and ‘No’ for the 
positive training condition. Feedback was given. 
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Following training, participants were found to interpret novel situations in the 
direction congruent with training. Notably, positive training was associated with 
reduced anxiety. This study was important in two ways. First, it demonstrated a 
direct causal link by which interpretation biases alter anxiety.  Second, it suggested 
the possibility of reducing anxiety through positive interpretation training. 
Since then these findings have been replicated and extended to show that 
interpretation training can survive the passage of time (up to 24 hours) and changes 
in environmental contexts (Hoppitt, Mathews, Yiend, & Mackintosh, 2010a, 2010b; 
Mackintosh, Mathews, Yiend, Ridgeway, & Cook, 2006; Yiend, Mackintosh, & 
Mathews, 2005).  
Other variations have also been developed. For example, some studies used 
homographs (Grey & Mathews, 2000; Wilson, MacLeod, Mathews, & Rutherford, 
2006). In this paradigm, participants were exposed to a series of homographs (e.g. 
‘sink’) each followed by a word fragment representing either a threatening (‘drown’) 
or a benign meaning (‘basin’). Positive training involved making repeated positive / 
benign interpretations of the homographs; vice versa for negative training.  
Another commonly used procedure is the word-sentence association task 
(Beard & Amir, 2008). In this task, participants were asked to determine, in repeated 
trials, whether a word (e.g. ‘approving’) and a sentence (e.g., ‘your supervisor 
discusses your future’) were ‘associated’.  Corrective feedback was given when the 
endorsed response represents a positive or benign resolution; using the above 
example, ‘correct’ will be shown following a response of ‘Yes’. 
 Though originally designed to target anxiety, CBM was later adapted for 
depression (Holmes, Mathews, Dalgleish, & Mackintosh, 2006). In particular, this 
paradigm argued for the advantage of fostering positive interpretations through 
29 
 
promoting positive imagery. Instead of completing word fragments, participants 
listened to positively resolved scenarios while creating mental images. Despite the 
strong evidence supporting the role of mental imagery in interpretation (Holmes, 
Lang, & Deeprose, 2009), contradictory findings have also been yielded (Standage, 
Ashwin, & Fox, 2009; Vassilopoulos, Blackwell, Moberly, & Karahaliou, 2011).  
Taken together, CBM studies have varied in terms of the type of training 
materials, the medium of presentation, task instructions, as well as the amount and 
duration of training. Despite these methodological differences, there is consistent 
evidence that this training paradigm is effective in reversing negative interpretation 
biases that are believed to play a key role in the aetiology and maintenance of mood 
disorders. There is also accumulating evidence to suggest that this change in 
cognition could improve mood especially when tested under the provocation of 
stress. These findings led to a hypothesis that CBM could be developed for 
therapeutic use for anxiety and depression. 
  To test this hypothesis, the effectiveness of CBM has to be established in 
populations with clinical or at least sub-clinical symptoms or traits of anxiety and 
depression. Therefore, the following systematic literature review was conducted to 
evaluate the evidence-base for the clinical and sub-clinical use of CBM by 
identifying and critically reviewing publications that have investigated the effects of 
CBM on these populations.  
 
1.3.2 Methods of the review 
1.3.2.1 Search strategy 
A literature search was conducted in two waves: the first took place between 
27/10/2010 and 15/11/2010, and the second between 19/03/12 and 30/03/12. 
30 
 
Combinations of the key terms ‘interpretation bias’, ‘cognitive bias’, and 
‘modification’ were searched in the following electronic databases on MetaLib (2000 
to date): SCOPUS, ASSIA, Scirus, and PsycINFO. ScienceDirect and PubMed (both 
2000 to date) were searched separately. Key journals (Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology and Behaviour Research and Therapy) were hand-searched using the 
above key terms (2000 to date). Websites of the research teams of the key authors (in 
alphabetic order: Amir, N., Beard, C., Hayes, S., Hirsch, C., Holmes, E.A., Hoppitt, 
L., Mackintosh, B., Mathews, A., Salemink, E., and Yiend, J.) and references of the 
retrieved papers were reviewed. The publication date cutoff was chosen because the 
first papers on CBM were published in 2000 (Grey & Mathews, 2000; Mathews & 
Mackintosh, 2000). 
 
1.3.2.2 Selection criteria 
Studies were considered for review if they met the following criteria: 
 English language  
 Reported original data (i.e., exclude reviews, commentaries, or theoretical 
discussions) 
 Peer-reviewed journals (i.e., exclude conference proceedings or unpublished 
dissertations) 
 Training targeted interpretation (i.e., exclude training exclusively targeting other 
types of information processing) 
 Targeted anxiety and / or depression  
 Sample selected based on clinical or subclinical levels of anxiety or depression 
symptoms or traits  
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1.3.2.3 Selection procedure 
The electronic search identified 285 publications. After discounting 
duplicates, 67 remained. Abstracts were screened to verify if the selection criteria 
were met, and whenever ambiguities arose full texts were consulted. Finally, 19 
papers (including two selected via references of retrieved papers) met the criteria and 
thus are included in this review. 
 
1.3.3 Results of the review 
To evaluate the evidence-base for the clinical use of CBM, studies are 
grouped according to psychological disorder and organised chronologically. Of the 
19 studies, seven targeted Generalised Anxiety Disorder (GAD) including high trait 
anxiety, seven Social Anxiety Disorder (SAD), one Spider Phobia, one Panic 
Disorder, two Depression, and one Mixed Depression and Anxiety. Methodological 
characteristics and results of these studies are summarised in Table 1.  
 
1.3.3.1 GAD and high trait anxiety 
 High trait anxiety is a vulnerability marker for anxiety and two studies have 
been conducted on this population. Mathews, Ridgeway, Cook, & Yiend (2007) is 
valuable in being the first to recruit high trait anxious participants. Randomisation 
was appropriately used to allocate participants to receive 4 sessions of CBM or a 
test-retest condition. Results were promising: Participants endorsed more positive / 
benign interpretations after training, and reported less trait anxiety after one week. 
The authors argued that this delayed effect was due to an interaction with real life 
stress, but this hypothesis was not directly tested as stress was not recorded. 
Furthermore, the test-retest control made it unclear whether the effects were due to 
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training or other non-specific factors. Results were further limited by the narrow 
range of self-rated outcomes measures.  
 The second study was Salemink, van den Hout, & Kindt (2009). Improving 
on the previous study, control participants were cued to endorse positive and 
negative interpretations with equal frequency. This provided better control over 
exposure to emotional materials, duration of testing and other factors. This study 
used a wider range of outcome measures, and emotional vulnerability was assessed 
with a laboratory stressor. Despite the more intense training schedule (8 consecutive 
days), this study yielded mixed results. Change in interpretation bias was detected by 
one task but not another; and this effect disappeared after 24 hours. Despite 
reductions in state and trait anxiety and general psychopathology, training had no 
effect on social anxiety or emotional vulnerability. These results did not lend support 
for the potential therapeutic use of CBM. 
 Instead of high trait anxiety, Hirsch, Hayes, & Mathews (2009) recruited 
participants who scored high on a worry scale. That half of the sample met 
diagnostic criteria for GAD made the study more clinically relevant. Both scenarios 
and homographs were used in training, which was problematic as the effect of each 
could not be differentiated. This study also failed to measure interpretation bias after 
training, although the outcome measures (thought intrusion, worry, and residual 
working memory) were relatively novel. Results suggested that training improved 
control over thought intrusions and worry, and thus freed up cognitive resources. 
This was demonstrated by an increase in residual working memory, although 
participants still displayed considerable levels of worry after training. 
 Further enhancing the clinical relevance of CBM research, Hayes, Hirsch, 
Krebs, & Mathews (2010) studied clinically diagnosed GAD patients. This study 
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improved upon the above by including interpretation bias as an outcome measure, 
but had the same drawback of combining two training paradigms. Results showed 
that training was successful in reducing negative interpretations and thought 
intrusions. Mediation analyses further suggested that changes in thought intrusions 
were mediated by the reduction in negative interpretations. However, there was no 
follow-up assessment, leaving the durability of effects unknown.   
 Steel et al. (2010) were the first to study individuals with clinically diagnosed 
schizophrenia and high trait anxiety. Each participant completed a single session of 
training and a single session of control in a counter-balanced order, with the two 
sessions at least 3 days apart. This within-subject crossover design increased 
statistical power and provided good experimental control. Ecological validity of the 
training was enhanced by having items modified to be relevant to the daily 
experience of people with schizophrenia. Results showed that training had no effect 
on interpretation bias or anxiety, thus rendering no support for the therapeutic use of 
CBM for this population, although the null effects could also be explained by an 
insufficient dose of training. Nevertheless, the positive feedback from participants 
was encouraging. 
 Similar to Hayes et al. (2010) above, Brosan, Hoppitt, Shelfer, Sillence, & 
Mackintosh (2011) studied individuals with clinically diagnosed anxiety disorders 
recruited from routine clinical practice, thus maximising the clinical relevance. This 
study was unique in providing CBM training for both interpretation and attention 
within a single study. Results showed a reduction in negative biases both in attention 
and interpretation as well as state and trait anxiety, although it was unclear whether 
the effect resulted from the attention or interpretation training. This study claimed to 
have shown a clinically significant reduction in anxiety based on the established 
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normative data of the questionnaire; this argument would have been stronger if 
clinical interviews were used. Finally, given the small sample size (N = 13) and a 
lack of control group, it might have been more appropriate to use a single case series 
design. Interestingly, most participants found the interpretation training more helpful 
than the attention training. 
 Hertel, Vasquez, Benbow, & Hughes (2011) attempted to unpack the 
mechanisms underlying the effects of CBM. Specifically, they tested a novel 
hypothesis that CBM works by impairing memory for negative resolutions. 
However, the results were presented amidst a mixture of ‘non-significant trends’, the 
interpretations of which were exaggerated on occasion. It was also doubtful whether 
the sample size (N = 40) was sufficient in supporting the amount of statistical 
comparisons carried out. Despite some evidence in support of the hypothesis, the 
effects were not robust across all analyses and the null effects on emotional states 
and responses to stressor were notable. Given the complexity of the paradigm, more 
piloting work would be beneficial before testing it directly on a population of 
anxious individuals. On a positive note, this line of research is helpful in furthering 
our understanding of the change mechanisms underlying CBM.  
 
1.3.3.2 Social anxiety  
 The first study on social anxiety was Murphy, Hirsch, Mathews, Smith, & 
Clark (2007) using a sample with high scores on a social anxiety questionnaire. 
Strengths of this study included a direct comparison between positive and non-
negative training (and an additional control condition) and appropriate use of 
randomisation. Results showed that the two types of training were equally effective 
in facilitating both positive and non-negative interpretations. When told of a 
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forthcoming social event, trained participants reported less predicted anxiety. 
However, this was measured by a simple self-rating and was not transferred to 
predictions of better performance in this perceived event. It remained unknown 
whether training could reduce anxiety during an actual event, and whether these 
results with a subclinical sample could be generalised into clinical populations. 
 Beard and Amir (2008) extended the above study by delivering 8 sessions of 
training instead of one. Positively, this study tested a new paradigm that used word-
sentence association combined with corrective feedback, which was compared with 
an appropriately matched control. Results showed that training was successful in 
facilitating benign vs. threat interpretation and reducing social anxiety. These effects 
were durable for at least 2 days, which was encouraging. Mediation analyses 
suggested that the change in interpretation predicted change in social anxiety, 
although the authors admitted that the sample might be underpowered to draw more 
definite conclusions. Furthermore, outcome measures were entirely reliant on self-
ratings and it was unclear whether results with this subclinical sample could be 
generalised to clinical populations. 
 Vassilopoulos, Banerjee, & Prantzalou (2009) is valuable as it was the only 
study with a child sample (age 10-11) using an age appropriate purpose-designed 
training. It also differed from the other studies by using non-computerised training 
materials. Participants were cued to endorse positive / benign interpretations of 
scenarios by corrective feedback. Training was shown to reduce negative 
interpretations, social anxiety and anticipated anxiety upon a perceived upcoming 
social event, although participants did not predict a better outcome of the event. 
Positively, these effects lasted for 2-3 days, which showed promising durability. 
However, the test-retest control made it inconclusive as to whether the effect was 
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due to training per se. The outcome measures were self-rated and it was unclear 
whether reduced predicted anxiety could be translated to reduced anxiety upon a real 
social event.   
 Amir, Bomyea, & Beard (2010) is theoretically interesting as it tested 
whether the interpretation training can modify other information processing biases, 
in this case attention. Attentional biases were measured in socially anxious 
participants after a single session of interpretation training, compared with a well-
matched control. Consistent with their hypothesis, trained participants became faster 
to disengage attention from threat information. The authors argued that the training 
might have provided practice for participants to reject negative information while 
accessing benign information, which in turn facilitated participants to ‘shift’ their 
attention away from threats. However, durability was not assessed by follow-up. The 
major drawback was that it failed to measure change in social anxiety, thus 
conclusions on clinical use could not be drawn.  
 Turner et al. (2011) tested the effects of a single session of CBM with 8 
adults experiencing social anxiety following recovery from psychosis. This study 
gave a clear rationale, and a single case series design was appropriately chosen for 
the exploratory purpose. Recruited from an early intervention service, it had high 
external validity. An appropriate stressor (i.e., walking in a busy place) was used, but 
mood was not measured afterwards. The findings were limited by the sample size, 
which were further compromised by missing data from 2 participants (i.e., 25% of 
the sample). Three participants displayed ‘beneficial change in interpretive bias’ but 
no details were given. Mood was measured by 4 sets of Visual Analogue Scales but 
only the mean score was presented. Feedback highlighted key challenges, such as the 
short-lived nature of the benefits and difficulty transferring learning to ‘the real 
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world’, which are useful information for developing future research and clinical 
applications.  
 Beard, Weisberg, & Amir (2011a) reported a randomised controlled trial 
investigating the combined effects of CBM for attention and interpretation (8 
sessions) on a sample of 32 individuals with SAD. Similar to Brosan et al. (2011), 
the combined approach had the advantage of maximizing the clinical impact but the 
drawback of not being able to differentiate the effects between the two. This was 
further confounded by the fact that most participants were receiving varying forms of 
concurrent treatments. Results were encouraging, although they should be treated 
with caution until replicated by a larger trial. Improvement in social anxiety was 
noted, both in self-reports and in social functioning with moderate to large effect 
sizes, although effects on interpretation bias was not assessed. Moderate ratings were 
reported for credibility and acceptability. Again, participants rated the interpretation 
training more positively than attention training and 70% considered eight sessions as 
appropriate, which are very helpful knowledge for future CBM work. 
 The first and only qualitative study on CBM was reported by Beard, 
Weisberg, & Primack (2011b). Although feedback has been collected from previous 
studies, this study provided a systematic analysis. A qualitative methodology was 
appropriately chosen for the purpose and executed according to established 
guidelines for qualitative studies. A good balance of positive and negative comments 
from participants was reported: CBM was considered as ‘easy’ and 
‘straightforward’, although some reported frustration and boredom. Overall, 
participants found the interpretation training more ‘intuitive’ and easier to perceive 
its relevance to anxiety than attention training, echoing the feedback from previous 
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studies (e.g., Beard et al., 2011a; Brosan et al., 2011). However, the generalizability 
of the results to the wider clinical populations was limited.  
 
1.3.3.3 Spider phobia 
 Teachman & Addison (2008) extended the CBM research to spider phobia. 
Strengths of this study included appropriate use of randomisation with two control 
conditions. However, the sample was recruited based on a questionnaire rather than 
clinical diagnosis, thus limiting the generalisability to clinical populations. Training 
materials were adapted to be spider-related, which was good for the purpose but 
validation was not clearly reported. A key advantage is that the outcome measures 
moved away from self-ratings and predicted anxiety by including the actual 
emotional and behavioural response upon seeing a spider. Results showed that 
training successfully altered interpretations, but it did not lessen the anxious 
responses upon provocation. It was unclear whether this was due to insufficient 
training dose or that changes in interpretation do not translate into reduced phobia. 
 
1.3.3.4 Panic disorder 
 Steinmain and Teachman (2010) was the only study that targeted panic 
disorder. Participants were individuals who scored high on a measure of anxiety 
sensitivity, a vulnerability marker for panic disorder (Ehlers, 1995). Again, training 
scenarios were purpose-designed but not validated. Positively, outcome measures 
included both subjective and objective measures of avoidance and fear during two 
tasks designed to provoke bodily sensations relevant to panic disorder. Although 
training was shown to reduce anxiety sensitivity, results on interpretation bias were 
mixed and training failed to reduce avoidance or fear upon provocation. It was 
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unclear whether these results were due to insufficient training dose, invalid training 
items, or that CBM is not effective in reducing this type of anxiety. Generalisability 
of findings to clinical populations was also uncertain. 
 
1.3.3.5 Depression 
 Blackwell and Holmes (2010) was the first study on depression. It was highly 
clinically relevant due to its sample of clinically diagnosed participants. Single case 
series design was appropriately chosen for the exploratory purpose and allowed for 
adjustment to training based on feedback, although its lack of control group and 
small sample size (N = 7) inevitably limited the findings. A key strength is the use of 
multiple time points: participants completed a one-week baseline period and a two-
week post-training follow-up. This provided a rich set of data. Four participants 
showed improvements in mood and / or interpretation bias. However, the visual 
inspection analysis made it difficult to draw definitive conclusions, in part due to the 
day-to-day fluctuations in mood and biases. The task to measure interpretation biases 
was purpose-designed but not validated. Overall, this study provided novel and 
promising results for the potential therapeutic use of CBM for depression, although 
results should be treated with caution until replicated by a larger scale controlled 
study. 
 Lang, Blackwell, Harmer, Davison, & Holmes (2012) extended the above by 
including a control group but otherwise following a similar methodology. The 
training was again imagery-focused but this time delivered via a combination of 
auditory, pictorial, and appraisal stimuli, with an effort to improve engagement. 
Results were encouraging, showing a significant reduction in depression, intrusive 
symptoms, and cognitive bias immediately post-training, although the evidence for 
40 
 
improvement in two-week follow-up was weak. It was also unclear to what extent 
the improvement was attributable to each of the three training components. At the 
time of writing, this study was the first and only controlled study with clinically 
depressed individuals. Although the results were limited by the small sample size (N 
=26) and limited evidence on the durability of the effects, this study represented a 
significant first step towards developing CBM as an effective treatment for 
depression.  
 
1.3.3.6 Mixed depression and anxiety 
Recognising that interpretation of ambiguity is only one form of cognitive 
bias, Lester, Mathews, Davison, Burgess, & Yiend (2011) validated a new form of 
CBM targeting 7 types of cognitive errors defined by clinical practice and theories 
(e.g., overgeneralisation, catastrophising). This study also argued for the need to 
develop CBM as a transdiagnostic tool given the high comorbidity between 
depression and anxiety presentations. One major advantage of this study was that 
new materials were developed from exemplars generated by therapists thus greatly 
improving the clinical relevance of the training materials. In experiment 2 of this 
publication, results illustrated the effectiveness of this CBM in reducing anxiety- and 
depression- related cognitive errors in students prone to these unhelpful thinking 
styles. One limitation was that the two sessions took place 5 – 9 days apart; it was 
unclear whether and how this might have affected the effects of training. The effects 
on emotional states and responses to stressors were mixed, with some only reported 
‘at trend levels’, leaving it unclear whether successful modification of cognitive 
errors could eventually translate into mood benefits. This new CBM also needs to be 
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tested on the clinical population before conclusions could be made regarding its 
therapeutic potential.  
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Table 1.1. Methodological Characteristics and Results of the 19 Studies with Clinical or Subclinical Samples of Anxiety and / or Depression 
 
  Study Sample Design Intervention Training  Outcome Measures Results 
GAD and High Trait Anxiety 
Mathews et 
al., 2007 
 
 
 
40 adults 
with high 
trait anxiety 
(subclinical) 
 
Between-
Subjects 
 
 
4 sessions / 2 
weeks training 
or test-retest 
control 
  
Scenarios and 
word fragments 
Interpretation bias;  
STAI–S;  
STAI–T (after 1 week) 
 
Increased positive / benign 
interpretations; no change in state 
anxiety; reduced trait anxiety after 
1week 
Salemink et 
al., 2009 
34 students 
with high 
trait anxiety 
(subclinical) 
Between-
Subjects 
 
 
8 daily 
sessions 
training or 
control 
training 
 
Scenarios and 
word fragments 
Interpretation bias; 
2 x VAS (depression, 
anxiety) post-stressor; 
STAI, SCL-90-R, FNE 
(last 3 after 24 h) 
Mixed results on interpretation bias;  
reduced STAI and  SCL-90-R but no 
change in FNE or stress vulnerability 
Hirsch et al., 
2009 
40 adults 
with high 
worry scores 
(21 met GAD 
criteria) 
(subclinical / 
clinical) 
 
Between-
Subjects 
1 session 
training or 
control 
training 
 
 
 
Homographs and 
scenarios 
(auditory) 
 
3 x VAS (anxiety, 
depression, happiness); 
Thought intrusion; 
Worry; Residual working 
memory capacity  
No immediate mood change; reduced 
thought intrusions and worry; 
increased residual working memory  
Hayes et al., 
2010 
40 adults 
with GAD  
(clinical) 
Between-
Subjects 
 
 
1 session 
training or 
control 
training 
 
Homographs and 
scenarios 
(auditory) 
Interpretation bias; 
STAI; 3 x VAS (anxiety, 
depression, happiness);  
Thought intrusion and 
Worry 
Reduced negative interpretations and 
thought intrusion; no immediate 
mood change 
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Steel et al., 
2010 
21 adults 
with 
schizophrenia 
and high trait 
anxiety 
(clinical) 
 
Within-
Subjects 
A-B design 
 
 
1 session 
training and 
control (filter 
tasks) 
Scenarios 
(auditory) and 
mental imagery 
Interpretation bias; 
STAI-S 
No effects on interpretation bias or 
state anxiety 
 
 
Brosan et al., 
2011 
13 adults 
with anxiety 
disorders 
(clinical)  
Within-
Subjects 
A-B design 
4 weekly 
training 
sessions 
Word-sentence 
association (plus 
training for 
attention) 
 
Interpretation bias; 
attentional bias; STAI; 
feedback 
Reductions in negative attentional 
and interpretation bias; reduced state 
and trait anxiety scores 
Hertel et al., 
2011 
(Experiment 2) 
40 students 
with high 
trait anxiety 
(subclinical) 
 
Between-
Subjects 
1 session 
training or 
control 
Scenarios and 
word fragments 
Memory recollection; 4 x 
VAS (depressed, tense, 
pessimistic, distressed) 
Reduced recollections for negative 
resolutions; no effects on mood or 
emotional responses to stressor 
Social Anxiety Disorder (SAD) 
Murphy et al., 
2007 
 
66 students 
with high 
scores on 
social anxiety 
(subclinical) 
Between-
Subjects 
 
 
1 session 
positive, non-
negative, or 
control 
training 
 
Scenarios 
(auditory) 
 
Interpretation bias; 
STAI–S; Self-rated 
anticipated anxiety and 
performance  
 
Increased positive / non-negative 
interpretations; reduced anticipated 
anxiety but no effect on predicted 
performance or state anxiety 
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Beard & Amir, 
2008 
27 students 
with high 
scores on 
social anxiety 
(subclinical) 
Between-
Subjects 
8 sessions / 4 
weeks training 
or control 
training 
 
Word-sentence 
association 
Interpretation bias; 
SPAI-SP; STAI–T;  
BDI-II (All after> 2 days) 
Increased benign vs. threat 
interpretations; reduced social 
anxiety; no effect on depression or 
anxiety 
 
 
Vassilopoulos 
et al., 2009 
 
 
 
43 children 
with high 
scores on 
social anxiety 
(subclinical) 
Between-
Subjects 
 
3 sessions / 8 
days training 
or test-retest 
control 
Scenarios on 
cards with 
feedback 
Interpretation bias; 
SASC-R; CDI; Self-rated 
anticipated anxiety & 
interpersonal liking (All 
after 2-3 days) 
 
Reduced negative interpretation but 
no change in benign interpretations; 
reduced social and anticipated 
anxiety; no effect on depression or 
predicted interpersonal liking 
Amir et al., 
2010 
57 adults 
with high 
scores on 
social anxiety 
(subclinical) 
 
Between-
Subjects 
 
1 session 
training or 
control 
training 
  
Word-sentence 
association 
Interpretation bias;  
Attentional bias; STAI–S;  
BDI-II 
 
Reduced interpretation and 
attentional bias to threat; no effect on 
state anxiety or depression 
Turner et al., 
2011 
8 adults with 
SAD 
following 
psychosis 
(clinical) 
 
Single case 
series 
1 session 
training 
Scenarios and 
word fragments 
Interpretation bias (after 
stressor), 4 x VAS 
(depression, distress, 
relaxed, pessimism), 
Feedback (After 1 week) 
 
All reported increase in positive 
mood, 3 participants showed 
‘beneficial changes’ in interpretation 
bias, 3 reported experiencing benefits 
Beard et al., 
2011a 
32 adults 
with SAD 
(clinical) 
 
Between-
Subjects 
8 sessions / 4 
weeks training 
or control 
training 
Word-sentence 
association (plus 
training for 
attention) 
 
LSAS-SR; behavioural 
assessment (impromptu 
speech); credibility and 
acceptability 
Reduced self-reported social anxiety, 
better speech quality in behavioural 
assessment; moderate ratings on 
credibility and acceptability 
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Beard et al., 
2011b 
10 adults 
with SAD 
(clinical) 
 
Qualitative 1 – 2 minutes 
demonstration 
of training 
materials 
Word-sentence 
association (plus 
attention 
training) 
 
LSAS (for screening); 
qualitative interviews 
Greater understanding and 
engagement with interpretation than 
attention modification 
Specific Phobia 
 
Teachman & 
Addison, 2008 
61 students 
with high 
fear for 
spider 
(subclinical) 
 
Between-
Subjects 
1 session 
training or 
control 
training or no 
training 
Spider scenarios 
and word 
fragments  
Interpretation bias; 
PANAS; Avoidance 
behaviour and self-rated 
fear upon seeing real spider 
 
Increased positive and reduced 
threatening interpretations; no effect 
on mood, avoidance or fear upon 
seeing real spider 
Panic Disorder 
Steinman & 
Teachman, 
2010 
75 students 
with high 
anxiety 
sensitivity 
(subclinical) 
 
Between-
Subjects 
1 session 
training or 
control 
training or no 
training  
Bodily 
sensation 
scenarios and 
word fragments 
 
Interpretation bias; Anxiety 
Sensitivity, PANAS, 
Avoidance and subjective 
fear upon provocation   
 
Mixed results on interpretation bias; 
reduced anxiety sensitivity but no 
effect on avoidance or fear upon 
provocation  
Depression 
Blackwell & 
Holmes, 2010 
7 clinically 
depressed 
adults  
(clinical) 
 
Single case 
series 
7 daily  
training 
sessions 
 
 
Scenarios 
(auditory) with 
mental imagery 
Interpretation bias; 
SCL-90-R; PANAS; 
BDI-II (After 2 wks) 
 
  
4 participants improved mood and/or 
bias; BDI-II and SCL-90-R reduced 
over whole sample 
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Lang et al., 
2012 
26 clinically 
depressed 
adults 
(clinical) 
Between-
Subjects 
7 daily 
training or 
control 
training 
Scenarios with 
mental imagery 
via auditory, 
pictorial 
stimuli, and 
appraisals 
 
Interpretation bias; IES; 
RIQ; HRSD; BDI-II; 
STAI-T (last 2 after 2 wks) 
Reduced depression, interpretation 
bias and intrusions post-training; 
reduced anxiety in both groups; 
‘trend’ for improvement in 
depression in 2 wks 
Mixed Depression and Anxiety 
Lester et al., 
2011 
(Experiment 2) 
70 students 
with 
cognitive 
errors related 
to depression  
or anxiety 
(subclinical) 
 
Between-
Subjects 
2 sessions 
training or 
control 
training (over 
5-9 days) 
Scenarios and 
word fragments 
targeting 7 
types of 
cognitive errors 
Interpretation bias; STAI; 
BDI-II; PANAS; 
anticipated anxiety for 
stressor 
Reduced cognitive errors, but mixed 
effects on mood and emotional 
responses to stressor 
 
Note. Unless otherwise specified, studies were quantitative, outcomes were measured immediately post-training, and training materials were 
visually presented by computers. BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory–II (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996); CDI = Children’s Depression Inventory 
(Greek; Kovacs, 1992); FNE = Fear for Negative Evaluation Scale (Watson & Friend, 1969); HRSD = Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression 
(Hamilton, 1967); IES = Impact of Event Scale (Horowitz, Wilner, & Alvarez, 1979); LSAS-SR = Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale - Self Report 
(Liebowitz, 1987); PANAS = Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (Watson & Clark, 1994); RIQ = Response to Intrusions Questionnaire 
(Clohessy & Ehlers, 1999); SASC-R = Social Anxiety Scale for Children–Revised (La Greca & Stone, 1993);  SCL-90-R = Symptom-Checklist-
90-Revised (Derogatis, 1992); STAI = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (T = Trait, S = State; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970); SPAI-SP = 
Social Phobia and Anxiety Inventory – Social Phobia Subscale (Turner, Beidel, Dancu, & Stanley, 1989); VAS = Visual Analogue Scale 
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1.3.4 Discussion of the review 
 This review identified 19 studies with clinical and subclinical samples. This 
small number suggests a scarcity of research in this area. Specifically, these 
publications were unevenly distributed across disorders, with the majority focused 
on GAD (including high trait anxiety) and social anxiety. There was only one study 
each on panic disorder, specific phobia, and mixed depressive and anxiety traits. 
Alarmingly, only two studies were on clinical depression, rendering it difficult to 
draw definite conclusions for this disorder. 
 Four studies did not report interpretation bias as an outcome variable (Beard 
et al., 2011a, 2011b; Hirsch et al., 2009). All other studies, except Steel et al. (2010), 
supported the hypothesis that CBM is effective in altering interpretation biases. 
However, the effects on facilitating positive / benign interpretations versus reducing 
negative interpretations were not always reported clearly.  
 Five studies showed a delayed effect on reducing anxiety (Beard & Amir, 
2008; Mathews et al., 2007; Salemink et al., 2009; Vassilopoulos et al., 2009) and 
depression (Blackwell & Holmes, 2010). These follow-up assessments were 
conducted between 24 hours and two weeks, suggesting promising durability. These 
authors argued that the delayed effect was due to an interaction with real life stress, 
but this was not directly tested as stress was not recorded. 
 Despite the absence of real life stress recording, 10 studies investigated the 
training effects on stress reactivity using experimental stressors but the results were 
mixed. For example, while being told of an upcoming event, trained socially anxious 
participants reported less predicted anxiety (Murphy et al., 2007, Vassilopoulos et 
al., 2009). However, while participants were actually engaged in stressful tasks, they 
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displayed similar negative responses to control participants. Therefore, there was 
only slight evidence to suggest an effect on stress reactivity.  
 In sum, there is strong evidence to suggest that CBM is effective in altering 
interpretation bias, although the results on mood and stress reactivity were mixed. 
These should be interpreted in conjunction with the methodological limitations 
discussed below. 
 
1.3.4.1 Review of methodology 
 Sample. All studies demonstrated appropriate sample selection with clear 
inclusion and exclusion criteria. Approximately half of the studies recruited based on 
clinical diagnoses, which enhanced the generalisability of the findings to clinically 
populations. However, in most studies it was unclear how sample size was 
determined.  
 Design. Except Beard et al. (2011b), all studies used quantitative methods. 
The majority used a Between-Subject design, with the exception of 2 within-subjects 
design and 2 single case series studies. For those that used the former, randomisation 
and double-blindness were appropriately used. However, two of them used only a 
test-retest control, rendering it difficult to differentiate training effect from 
confounding factors. The majority used a matched placebo training, which provides 
a better control over exposure to emotional materials, demand characteristics, and 
attention from experimenters.  
 Training. There was a wide variation in training materials, medium of 
presentation, task instructions, and duration of training, making it difficult to 
compare the results across studies. Most studies adapted training items to suit 
specific client groups but failed to report a validation procedure. 
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 Outcome measures. Interpretation bias was measured by mixed methods, 
and other outcome measures on mood and vulnerability were overwhelmingly reliant 
on self-reports, leaving results at risk of demand characteristics (MacLeod, Koster, & 
Fox, 2009). Some of the measures and experimental stressors were purpose-
designed, which was appropriate but the validation process was unclear.  
 Size of change. Effect size and clinical significance were not frequently 
reported, although this data have started emerging amongst the more recent 
publications. This trend is helpful for future research and consideration for clinical 
use.  
 
1.3.4.2 Theoretical implications 
 Altogether, these findings illustrated that interpretation bias is malleable even 
in clinical and subclinical populations. This is remarkable as these populations are 
known to have stronger interpretation biases (see section 1.2.2).  
The key theoretical question is this: How does CBM work? CBM was 
originally designed to be a cognitive training; the presumption was that CBM works 
by training people to interpret situations in a more positive and / or less negative 
way, which subsequently reduces negative mood. However, the causation between 
cognitive and mood changes has been a major point of debate. In particular, some 
suggested that changes in interpretation biases may have been mediated by mood 
changes instead. However, this hypothesis appeared to be unsubstantiated. First, 
many CBM studies have observed changes in interpretation biases without mood 
changes (e.g. Experiment 2 in Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000; Salemink, van den 
Hout, & Kindt, 2007b), suggesting that mood changes are not prerequisites for 
cognitive changes. Second, mediation analyses have illustrated that changes in trait 
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anxiety were mediated by cognitive changes (Salemink, van den Hout, & Kindt, 
2010a). Third, studies using mood induction have shown that cognitive changes 
resulting from CBM training survived mood alteration (Salemink & van den Hout, 
2010). The above therefore argued against the hypothesis that interpretation 
modification is mood-dependent.  
If cognitive changes are not mediated by mood changes, what then are the 
mechanisms of change? Within this review, only one study (Hertel et al., 2011) was 
specifically designed to directly examine the change mechanisms. This study 
suggested that interpretation modification may work by reducing memory 
recollection for negative resolutions, although the results were confounded by a 
number of limitations (see section 1.3.3.1). Mathews and MacLeod (2000) suggested 
that repeated practice on accessing benign interpretations primes the cognitive 
process to select a benign over threatening meaning when encountering novel 
situations. However, some (e.g. Murphy et al., 2007) argued that the training effect is 
due to a similar process to conditioning (Rachman, 1977). In other words, some 
doubted whether participants have actually learned a new way to interpret 
ambiguous situations or whether they have simply been conditioned (via corrective 
feedback) to endorse a task-specific response. To illustrate that learning has taken 
place beyond conditioning, some studies have shown that the effects of CBM 
training could be generalised and transferred across environmental contexts (e.g. 
change in room, experimenter and setting, see Mackintosh et al., 2006) and domains 
(Salemink, van den Hout, & Kindt, 2010b). However, on the other hand, the 
cognitive effects of CBM were not replicated when interpretation biases were 
measured by tasks that did not resemble the training tasks (e.g. an implicit 
homograph task and questionnaires in Salemink, van den Hout, & Kindt, 2007a, a 
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vignette and video task in Salemink et al., 2010b). The evidence that the cognitive 
effects of CBM could not be generalised and transferred to other tasks lends partial 
support to the argument that participants may have simply learned a task-specific 
response. 
While it remained unclear whether participants have learned a new way of 
interpretation or whether they have learned a task-specific response, it is clear that 
some kind of learning has taken place. The next question was therefore whether 
participants were consciously aware of the new ‘rules’ that they have acquired in the 
training procedure. Results were mixed. In Mathews and Mackintosh (2000), 
participants reported that they were not aware of the intention of the procedure, 
leading to the hypothesis that participants learn to apply the interpretation rule in an 
implicit way. This result also gave evidence that the effects of CBM were unlikely to 
be fully accountable by demand characteristics. By contrast, a later study found that 
participants were largely aware of the valence of their training materials; more 
importantly, this knowledge was found to partially mediate the cognitive effects of 
CBM (Salemink et al., 2007b). A recent review also suggested that for future clinical 
use, providing a clear rationale of the training may boost the benefits of the training 
(Beard, 2011). 
In addition, recent research has also highlighted the important role of mental 
imagery in cognitive modification. In Holmes and Mathews (2005), participants 
listened to ambiguous situations resolved either positively or negative depending on 
training condition. Crucially, half of them in each condition were specifically asked 
to create mental imagery while the other half was asked to concentrate on the verbal 
meaning. Results suggested that mental imagery significantly increased the impact of 
negative training comparing with verbal processing. This evidence for the benefits of 
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mental imagery was later extended in a subsequent study where mental imagery was 
found to enhance the effects of positive training (Holmes, Mathews, Dalgleish, & 
Mackintosh, 2006). Mental imagery was also found to be more effective than verbal 
processing in protecting individuals against worsening of mood when challenged by 
a negative mood induction (Holmes, Lang, & Shah, 2009). This line of evidence was 
recently extended to clinical populations of depression and anxiety (Blackwell & 
Holmes, 2010; Lang, Blackwell, Harmer, Davison & Holmes, 2012).  
Finally, it is important to note that CBM training for interpretation was 
shown to alter not only interpretation but also attention bias (Amir et al., 2010), 
suggesting that training effects are transferable across types of information 
processing. Two studies (Beard et al., 2011a; Brosan et al., 2011) also showed that 
CBM for interpretation and attention could be used in conjunction to maximise 
clinical impact, although it was unclear to what extent the benefits were attributable 
to each. Finally, these results showed a robust effect on interpretation bias despite 
the wide variation of training methods used, although it remains to be determined 
what the optimal training package is. 
 
1.3.4.3 Clinical implications 
 That CBM can reduce symptoms up to two weeks is promising. Evidence 
appears to be particularly strong for reducing trait and social anxiety. However, it is 
not evident that CBM can protect participants against negative emotional and 
behavioural responses upon provocation, nor is the evidence sufficiently robust for 
specific phobia, panic disorder or other types of anxiety disorder. There have been 
encouraging results for depression, although evidence so far has been based on two 
studies only. To be clinically useful, the effects would eventually need to be 
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established outside the laboratory and beyond two weeks. Furthermore, CBM needs 
to be compared against active treatments such as Cognitive Behavioural Therapy or 
pharmacological treatment in terms of efficacy and cost-effectiveness. The current 
results show that this computerized training programme can be used by participants 
independently at home (e.g., Blackwell & Holmes, 2010; Lang et al., 2011), 
suggesting a high potential cost-effectiveness. Finally, there have been an increasing 
number of studies reporting feedback from participants, which revealed high levels 
of acceptability, although future studies will have to address some of the negative 
comments such as ‘monotonous’ and ‘boring’ (Beard et al., 2011a, 2011b; Blackwell 
& Holmes 2010; Brosan et al., 2011). This is important as acceptability and 
engagement are prerequisites for clinical application. 
 
1.3.4.4 Conclusion and future research 
 In conclusion, research into the clinical and subclinical use of CBM for 
depression and anxiety is still at an early stage. Despite some promising evidence, 
results have been compromised by methodological limitations and thus need to be 
treated with caution until replicated. This review in particular highlighted three 
major gaps in research: First, there has been an alarming scarcity of CBM research 
for depressive symptoms or vulnerability. Second, this review identified only one 
study that examined the effects of CBM on children with subclinical symptoms of 
anxiety, highlighting the need to extend research into the younger age group. Last 
but not least, future research should seek to improve the measures for emotional 
vulnerability using both naturally occurring and experimental stressors. Indeed, the 
present thesis study was specifically conceptualised to address some of these issues. 
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This will be further described in the next and final section of this introductory 
chapter.  
 
1.4 Thesis Investigation 
Taken together, the above sections of this chapter illustrated a volume of 
literature in support of the hypothesis that cognitive biases are trait vulnerability 
markers preceding depression and anxiety (section 1.2). Recent development of 
CBM targeting on modifying these biases, especially interpretation biases, has 
yielded promising results, although further research is warranted to clarify the 
inconsistent findings regarding the training effects on mood and vulnerability. Our 
systematic literature review (section 1.3) further highlighted the potential of CBM to 
be developed as a therapeutic tool, but the findings so far have been concentrated on 
adults. As noted in a previous study: ‘given developmental differences in cognitive 
maturation between adolescents, adults, and children (Blakemore, 2006, 2008), we 
cannot necessarily expect the same pattern of results to emerge in response to 
training in adults and children as in adolescents.’ (Lothmann, Holmes, Chan, & Lau, 
2011, p.25). Therefore, this final section of the Introduction will briefly review the 
evidence for interpretation biases in youth (section 1.4.1), followed by the studies 
examining the effects of CBM in this age group (section 1.4.2). 
 
1.4.1 Interpretation biases in youth 
Despite the relative scarcity of studies in youth comparing with adults, 
interpretation biases have been associated with symptoms of and risk for depression 
and anxiety in children and adolescents. 
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Specifically, Dearing and Gotlib (2009) illustrated that girls at risk for 
depression were more likely to make negative interpretations of ambiguous 
emotional information than girls at lower risk for depression. Here the vulnerable 
group consisted of 10 – 14 year old daughters of depressed mothers, whereas the 
comparison group consisted of girls of mothers with no history of depression. This 
risk factor was appropriately chosen based on the strong evidence that suggests 
parental depression as a risk factor for depression (Gotlib & Goodman, 1999); 
however, the authors also acknowledged that parental depression could also elevate 
risk for other types of psychopathology (Weissman et al., 2006) thus the results may 
not be exclusive to depression. One major limitation was that interpretation bias was 
only tested after a negative mood induction; it was therefore unclear whether 
vulnerability per se, without experimentally induced depressive mood, is associated 
with negative interpretation biases. In addition, a number of studies have illustrated 
negative interpretation biases in children and adolescents with clinical levels of 
anxiety. In Taghavi, Moradi, Neshat-Doost, Yule, & Dagleish, (2000), children and 
adolescents (age 8 – 17) with clinical diagnosis of GAD were asked to generate 
sentences using homographs (i.e. words that have both positive / neutral and negative 
meanings, such as ‘hit’ and ‘tank’). Comparing with the non-clinical control group, 
these anxious youth generated more sentences consistent with negative 
interpretations. Consistent with this, the level of self-rated trait anxiety was found to 
be correlated with negative interpretation biases measured by a pictorial homograph 
task in a non-selected sample of typically developed children (age 7 – 9; Hadwin, 
Frost, French, & Richards, 1997). This association between trait anxiety and 
interpretation biases was similarly observed in Chorpita, Albano, & Barlow (1996). 
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Apart from homographs, interpretation biases could be indicated using 
ambiguous scenarios. For example, Barrett, Rapee, Dadds, & Ryan (1996) asked 
anxious children to interpret ambiguous situations and devise a behavioural plan. 
Results suggested that, comparing with non-clinical control participants, anxious 
children were more likely to interpret situations as threatening and subsequently 
more likely to adopt avoidant behavioural plans. Interestingly, interpretation biases 
appeared to be enhanced after interaction with parents indicating a role of family 
interactions in the cognitive processing of anxious children. Using the ambiguous 
scenarios approach, the role of interpretation biases has been demonstrated across 
different forms of anxiety. In particular, adolescents with elevated symptoms of 
social anxiety have been shown to be biased towards negative interpretations of 
ambiguous situations depicting social interactions comparing with adolescents with 
average level of social anxiety (Miers, Blote, Bogels, & Wastenberg, 2008). This 
tendency to interpret ambiguous situations in a negative way was also observed in 
children and adolescents with separation anxiety, social anxiety, and GAD (Bogels 
& Zigterman, 2000). Findings regarding the presence of interpretation bias in these 
three anxiety conditions were further extended in Waters, Graske, Bergman, & 
Treanor (2008). In this study, youth (7-12 years old) with separation anxiety, social 
anxiety and GAD were compared with an at-risk group (youth with parents who 
have anxiety disorders) and a non-clinical control group. Participants listened to 
ambiguous situations and were asked to rate the extent to which they thought each of 
the situations was dangerous; they were also asked to anticipate their emotional 
responses and their ability to deal with the situations if they happened to them in real 
life. Results suggested that those who had an anxiety disorder anticipated more 
negative emotions and less ability to cope with the situations comparing with the 
57 
 
other two groups (which did not differ from each other). The study therefore 
concluded that interpretation bias might be more a characteristic of current 
experience of anxiety rather than a vulnerability marker. By contrast, in a 
longitudinal study, interpretation biases were found to predict post-traumatic stress 
disorder symptoms in children prospectively (Ehlers, Mayou, & Bryant, 2003), thus 
supporting the claim that interpretation bias plays a role in the development of 
vulnerability.  
The above studies investigated interpretation bias across a wide age group. It 
should be noted that, although interpretation bias has been indicated in both children 
and adolescents, research has suggested that age moderates the relationship between 
negative interpretation bias and anxiety such that the link appears to be stronger in 
older children and adolescents (above 11 years) than in the younger group (Cannon 
& Weems, 2010; Weems, Berman, Silverman, Silverman, & Saavdra, 2001). The 
clinical implication is that techniques designed to reduce depression or anxiety 
through reducing interpretation biases, such as CBM, are likely to be more effective 
in adolescents than in younger children. 
 
1.4.2 CBM research on unselected youth population 
Our systematic review indicated only one CBM study on children with 
elevated symptoms (Vassilopoulous et al., 2009). Even when unselected samples 
were included, only a handful of studies were found. Specifically, the effects of 
CBM on interpretation bias were replicated in four separate studies with healthy 
children (Lester, Field, & Muris, 2011a; Lester, Field, & Muris, 2011b; Muris, 
Huijding, Mayer, & Hameetman, 2008; Muris, Huijding, Mayer, Remmerswaal, & 
Vreden, 2009). 
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In Muris et al., 2008, 8-12 year old children were allocated to receive either 
positive or negative interpretation training in the context of a hypothetical space 
journey (‘space odyssey’). Similar to the CBM paradigm used in adult studies, 
children were presented ambiguous scenarios. Each scenario was followed by two 
outcomes, depicting a positive and a negative resolution of the scenario. Children in 
the positive training condition received feedback of ‘good’ every time they endorsed 
the positive outcome, whereas those in the negative condition were reinforced to 
endorse the negative outcome. Results suggested that children in the negative 
condition perceived more threat in new ambiguous situations, suggesting that 
children, like adults, could be trained to make positive or negative interpretation. 
This training effect was found to be more prominent amongst those who had higher 
levels of anxiety. However, this study did not assess interpretation bias at baseline. 
Extending on this study, Muris and colleagues conducted a subsequent study; this 
time pre- and post- measures were included as well as a measure for avoidance 
tendency (Muris et al., 2009). Results showed that positive training led to a decrease 
in interpretation bias and avoidance tendency, whereas the negative training led to an 
increase in both. However, the authors acknowledged that the effect sizes were 
small. Unlike Muris et al., 2008, anxiety level was not indicated as a moderator in 
this study. Overall, the key criticism was that the ecological validity for this ‘space 
odyssey’ paradigm was doubtful; while the context of space journey might have 
helped engaging children, it was unclear whether children could transfer their 
learning to real life situations. In addition, the training effects on mood were not 
assessed, and results concerning the role of anxiety on training effects were mixed. 
Using one session, these studies were not able to test out the durability of the 
training effects. 
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In a study investigating the effect of interpretation training on animal fear 
(Lester et al., 2011a), the space odyssey was modified to present scenarios involving 
Australian marsupials. The training effect on interpretation bias was replicated; this 
study further suggested that positive training reduced behavioural avoidance 
assessed by a stress-evoking behavioural avoidance test. However, this benefit did 
not translate into reduction of anxiety or physiological response (measured by heart 
rate) towards the stressor. In a separate study conducted by the same research group 
(Lester et al., 2011b), participants were recruited across a wider age group (7 – 15 
year old) and training materials involved scenarios targeting on both animal fear and 
social anxiety. Training effects on interpretation biases were again replicated. In 
particular, younger participants (age 7-10) were found to be more susceptible to the 
training that induced animal fear, whereas older participants (age 11-15) were more 
prone to acquire biases for social scenarios. This pattern of results highlighted that 
training materials need to be consistent with the type of anxiety that is age-sensitive. 
However, this study did not yield evidence for changes in mood or stress reactivity 
despite using two separate stressors. 
The scarcity of CBM research is equally obvious in adolescent populations. 
So far, no study has tested the effects of CBM on adolescents at risk for emotional 
disorders. However, four studies have published results providing evidence that 
CBM could be used in this age group (Lau, Molyneaux, Telman, & Belli, 2011; 
Lothmann et al, 2011; Salemink & Wiers, 2011; Salemink & Wiers, 2012). All these 
studies employed the CBM training used in the original study (Mathews & 
Mackintosh, 2000) with scenarios adapted for use with younger people.  
Lothmann et al., 2011 was the first CBM study to report that after positive 
training adolescents showed more positive and fewer negative interpretations 
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comparing with those who received negative training. This study also showed that 
positive training reduced negative affect. The negative training also appeared to 
reduce positive affect, although this effect was only significant amongst male 
participants suggesting that gender acts as a moderator of training effects on mood. 
By contrast, trait anxiety was not indicated as a moderator in this study. In a 
subsequent study using a similar design (Lau et al., 2011), the effect on interpretation 
bias was replicated. However, positive training was not shown to cause mood 
changes. Instead, negative training was found to reduce positive affect amongst those 
with low self efficacy scores, highlighting the moderating role of self efficacy in 
training effects. Again, trait anxiety was not indicated as a moderator. This second 
study was based on a small sample (N = 36), thus it was not clear whether it was 
sufficiently powered. These studies were valuable in extending the CBM research 
into adolescents. However, a number of key methodological limitations were 
indicated. First,  there was no baseline measure of interpretation bias; second, mood 
was only measured by simple visual analogue scales rather than standardised 
instruments; third, training effects on stress reactivity were not tested; and finally, 
there was no follow-up assessment giving no indication for the potential durability of 
the training effects. These methodological limitations greatly weakened the validity 
and generalisability of the findings 
Improving upon these studies, Salemink and Wiers (2011) employed a pre- 
and post- measure of both interpretation bias and state anxiety. Instead of comparing 
between positive and negative training conditions, this study compared positive 
CBM training with a placebo-controlled group. In line with the adult literature, this 
study showed that CBM was effective in facilitating positive and reducing negative 
interpretations. However, there was no effect on state anxiety. Further analyses 
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indicated baseline interpretation bias as a moderator such that the training effect was 
more prominent amongst those with higher levels of baseline bias. Similar to the 
above two adolescent studies, there was no evidence for trait anxiety acting as a 
moderator. However, again, this study did not test the effects of CBM on stress 
reactivity, nor did it examine the effects beyond a single session.  
Using a subgroup of the above sample, Salemink and Wiers (2012) 
investigated the effect of regulatory control by administering the Stroop Task before 
and after training. As expected, this subgroup replicated the effect of CBM on 
interpretation bias. In addition, this study showed that threat related interpretation 
bias was most prominent amongst adolescents who had low levels of regulatory 
control and high levels of state anxiety; these adolescents also appeared to benefit 
most from CBM training. This study was the first adolescent study to move beyond a 
comparison between CBM and control condition by being specifically designed to 
investigate potential moderators. However, this study suffered methodological 
limitations such as the lack of follow-up assessments. 
Taken together, the findings with the younger population replicated adult 
literature in suggesting that interpretation bias is modifiable; however, the effects on 
mood and vulnerability remained inconsistent. Notably, no adolescent studies 
recruited based on elevated symptoms of or risk factors for anxiety or depression. 
However, analyses were performed to compare between those who had higher vs. 
lower scores on trait anxiety (Lau et al., 2011; Salemink & Wiers, 2011), baseline 
negative interpretation bias (Salemink & Wiers, 2011), and self-efficacy (Lau et al., 
2011). As mentioned above, the effects of CBM were more pronounced amongst 
adolescents who have lower scores on self-efficacy and higher levels of baseline 
negative interpretation; these findings lend preliminary support for the potential of 
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CBM to be developed as a preventive intervention for adolescents at risk, but they 
should be treated with caution until further replicated. Nevertheless, given the 
overall scarcity of research on youth, the relatively patchy pattern of results 
(especially around mood and vulnerability), and the various methodological 
limitations of previous studies, the effects of CBM on this age group need to be 
further replicated and extended before more definitive conclusions could be drawn. 
 
1.4.3 Thesis investigation and research hypotheses 
 Therefore this study set out to further examine effects of CBM on 
adolescents. To address the limitations highlighted above, this study broadened the 
range of outcome measures to include not only interpretation biases and mood states, 
but also reactivity to stress both experimentally induced and naturally occurring 
outside the laboratory. These were assessed across three time points to enable 
comparison between baseline, immediately post-intervention and one week follow-
up, with the latter included to test out the durability of the effects. Feedback was also 
collected to examine acceptability and identify areas for future improvement. A 
control group that received parallel sessions of placebo training was included to rule 
out unspecific effects of time. A non-selective sample of healthy adolescents aged 16 
to 18 with no self-reported history of mental health illness was recruited and 
randomised to investigate the above. Based on the above, the key hypotheses were as 
follows: 
 
1) Effects of CBM on Interpretation Bias: Compared with the control group, the 
CBM group would show a greater increase in positive interpretations and / or a 
greater reduction in negative interpretations following intervention. 
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2) Effects of CBM on Depression, Anxiety, and Affect: Compared with the control 
group, the CBM group would show a greater reduction in depression, anxiety 
and negative affect, as well as a greater increase in positive affect following 
intervention. 
3) Effects of CBM on Stress Vulnerability: Participants in the CBM group would 
display a more positive response towards the experimental stressor (i.e., endorse 
more benign interpretations and report more positive affect and / or less negative 
affect). In addition, the CBM group would rate their mood more positively and 
report fewer stressful events during the follow-up period than the control group.  
4) Role of Neuroticism: One objective of this study was to explore whether CBM 
could be developed as a preventive tool for adolescents at risk for developing 
depression, by virtue of high neuroticism. Given that no previous research has 
investigated the effects of CBM on adolescents with high neuroticism, this study 
did not make specific hypotheses regarding the role of neuroticism. However, the 
key questions were: 
a) Would CBM be effective in modifying interpretation bias, mood, and stress 
vulnerability in participants with high neuroticism scores? 
b) Would the effects of CBM be moderated by the level of neuroticism? 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Method 
2.1 Design Overview 
 This study adopted a randomised between-groups experimental design with 
three time points. A sample of adolescents aged 16 to 18 years were recruited and 
randomised into receiving either two sessions of CBM training or control condition 
on consecutive days. Their interpretation biases and mood were assessed at baseline 
before the intervention (Time 1), immediately after the final session of the 
intervention (Time 2), and 1 week after the final session of the intervention (Time 3). 
To examine the effects of training on stress vulnerability, participants were exposed 
to a controlled experimental stressor after Time 2 assessment and their interpretation 
of, and emotional reaction to, the stressor were measured. In addition, during the 
week between Time 2 and Time 3, participants were asked to give daily self-ratings 
of their mood and report any positive or negative events that they experienced on 
each day via email or mobile phone text messages. In summary, the key independent 
variable was the type of intervention (CBM vs. control), and the dependent variables 
were interpretation bias, mood (depression symptoms, state anxiety, trait anxiety, 
positive and negative affect), stress vulnerability measured by reaction to 
experimental stressor (interpretation of stressor and emotional responses to stressor), 
and stress vulnerability measured by reaction to naturally occurring stress (daily 
reports of mood and positive and negative events).  
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2.2 Participants   
 
2.2.1 Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
 Adolescents aged 16 to 18 who had the capacity to consent were considered 
eligible. Those who reported having any current or past diagnosed psychological 
disorders were excluded as these individuals might represent a different population 
to the one being targeted here. This study also excluded those who reported having 
severe reading difficulties or those who did not possess sufficient fluency in English 
to complete the tasks. These criteria were determined based on self-reports on the 
Screening Questionnaire (see below for details). 
 
2.2.2 Screening and recruitment  
 Recruitment took place from a sixth form college in Cambridgeshire, UK. To 
advertise the study, the experimenter went to the college and gave a presentation 
about psychology and talked to the students about this study. A poster was put up on 
students’ notice boards. The poster, together with the information sheet, was also 
circulated by email from the Head of Psychology to all the students (see Appendix A 
and B).  
Interested students were asked to fill in a short Screening Questionnaire 
through the SurveyMonkey website to screen for eligibility. Specifically, this 
included questions about demographic information, history of psychological 
disorders or reading difficulties, self-perceived fluency in English, and the 12-item 
Neuroticism Scale of the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ; Eysenck & 
Eysenck, 1975; see Appendix C). The adult version of EPQ was employed as it has 
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been shown to be a more reliable measure of neuroticism in this age group than its 
junior version (Pearson & Francis, 1984).  
 Out of the 149 students who filled in the questionnaire, six students were 
excluded due to self-reported reading difficulties or past diagnosed psychological 
disorders (three per each category). The remaining students were invited to 
participate in the study.  
 
2.2.3 Sample size 
The final sample consisted of 74 students (age range = 16 – 18, mean = 
16.64, SD = 0.67). They gave written informed consent to participate in the study 
(see Appendix D).  The majority were female (n = 67; 90.5%), ethnically White (n = 
70; 94.6%), and considered English as their first language (n = 68; 91.9%). The 
mean neuroticism score was 5.36 (SD = 3.03). All of them reported themselves as 
‘fluent in English’.  
To explore the role of neuroticism, at the second stage of the analyses, 
participants were divided into high neuroticism and low neuroticism subgroups using 
median split. Thus, the high neuroticism subgroup consisted of 37 participants with 
neuroticism scores above median, whereas low neuroticism subgroup consisted of 
the 37 participants with neuroticism scores below median. 
 
2.2.4 Power calculation 
The above sample sizes were determined using power calculations. For the 
overall non-selected sample, a power calculation was performed based on two 
previous CBM studies with adolescents using similar training materials (Lau et al., 
2011; Lothmann et al., 2011). Both studies reported a large effect size (d > 1.03), 
67 
 
suggesting that a minimum of 14 participants per group (i.e. 28 participants in total) 
is required to reach a power of 0.8 as conventionally agreed to be acceptable 
(Howell, 2002).  
In addition, to examine Hypothesis IV regarding the role of neuroticism, 
some analyses were conducted within the high neuroticism subgroup. A separate 
power calculation was performed to estimate the size required for this sub-sample. 
No previous CBM research has been conducted with adolescents with high 
neuroticism or other high risk factors; power calculation was therefore based on an 
adult study with anxious participants (Murphy et al., 2007). The calculation 
suggested that 10 participants per group are required to reach a power of 0.8.  
Due to a possible publication bias in favour of reports with large effect size 
and concerns over attrition, this study therefore recruited beyond these limits. 
 
2.2.5 Randomisation  
Participants were randomised into receiving either two sessions of CBM 
training (‘CBM group’) or parallel sessions of control training (‘Control group’), 
stratified by gender and neuroticism score, using a block randomisation approach 
with a computerised random number generator. The two groups were matched in 
age, gender, ethnicity, neuroticism scores, and language use (all p’s > .12; see Table 
2.1).  
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Table 2.1 
Demographic Characteristics of the CBM (n = 37) and Control (n=37) Groups 
Variable CBM Control t or z P 
Categorical Variables 
Gender  - Female 
 
32 (86.5%) 
 
35 (94.6%) 
 
1.19 
 
.23 
Ethnicity - White 34 (91.9%) 36 (97.3%) 1.03 .30 
English as first 
language 
33 (89.2%) 35 (94.6%) 0.85 .40 
Numerical Variables 
Age 
 
16.51 (0.69) 
 
16.76 (0.64) 
 
1.57 
 
.12 
N Scores 5.49 (3.16) 5.24 (2.93) 0.34 .73 
Note. For categorical variables, values represent number of participants and 
percentage (in brackets), and z was reported. For numerical variables, values 
represent group means and standard deviations (in brackets), and t was reported. 
 
2.3 Intervention 
 
2.3.1 CBM training  
 This study employed a modified version of the original CBM paradigm 
(Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000) specially adapted for use with adolescents with 
themes relating to peer and romantic relationships as well as educational and 
recreational achievements (Lothmann, et al., 2011). Two matched gender-specific 
versions were used for male and female participants. Based on evidence that imagery 
can enhance the effects of CBM (Holmes et al., 2006), each session started with a 
short ‘imagination exercise’, which asked participants to imagine biting into a 
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lemon. Participants were reminded regularly throughout the task to imagine the 
scenarios ‘as happening to yourself’. 
The actual training phase started with a practice trial to help participants 
familiarise themselves with the task procedure. After that, participants read a series 
of ambiguous scenarios on a computer screen each ending with a word fragment. In 
the CBM training, the word fragment resolved the ambiguity in a positive way. For 
example: ‘It is the first day of term. Your new teacher asks everyone to stand up and 
introduce themselves. After you have finished, you guess the others thought you 
sounded…’ followed by a word fragment ‘cl-v-r’ (clever). Participants completed the 
word fragment by typing in the first missing letter, and then answered a 
‘comprehension question’ designed to emphasise the positive resolution of the 
situation. With the above example, the comprehension question was ‘Do you feel 
unhappy with your introduction?’ This question could only be answered correctly (in 
this case ‘No’) if the ambiguous situation had been interpreted in the positive 
direction. Immediate feedback was given (‘Correct!’ or ‘Wrong!’) to facilitate 
learning. 
The training task was designed such that participants had to type in the first 
correct letter of the word fragment in order to proceed to the next trial; the accuracy 
for completing word fragments was therefore by default 100%. Training 
performance was thus measured by the remaining three variables across two training 
sessions: the accuracy for comprehension questions (percentage correct), reaction 
time for comprehension questions and reaction time for word fragments. 
 Training was self-paced and delivered across two sessions, each consisting of 
40 training scenarios plus 8 ‘distractor’ scenarios. The latter prompted participants to 
make neutral or negative interpretations, and were added to make the purpose of the 
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training less explicit (Lothmann et al., 2011; Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000). Thus, a 
total of 96 items were used. They were presented in a random order and across 4 
blocks in each session to allow participants to take a short break in-between. All 
materials were presented on computers using E-Prime 2.0 software, which also 
recorded responses automatically. 
 
2.3.2 Control condition 
 Participants in the control group received two parallel sessions of ‘placebo 
training’. They were presented with the same scenarios as in the experimental group, 
except that this time the emotional ambiguity of the scenarios was not resolved. 
Using the above example of ‘The first day of term’, the matched control scenario 
was: ‘It is the first day of term. Your new teacher asks everyone to stand up and 
introduce themselves. After you have finished, another person gets up to’ followed 
by a word fragment ‘s-eak’ (speak). The corresponding comprehension question was 
‘Is it the first day of term?’ These items were developed to keep the valence of the 
items neutral, such that participants were not coached to interpret the ambiguous 
situations in any specific direction. This control training was intended to ensure that 
participants from the two groups were exposed to the similar materials and engaged 
in the same level of attention, activity, cognitive efforts, and time commitment. 
 
2.4 Measures 
 
2.4.1 Measures for interpretation bias 
 Interpretation bias was assessed using the Recognition Test in the original 
CBM paradigm (Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000) with materials again adapted for use 
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with adolescents (Lau et al., 2011; Lothmann et al., 2011). To reduce practice effect 
and repetition of materials, two matched sets of materials (versions A, B) were used 
in a counterbalanced order (ABA vs. BAB). Specifically, half of the participants 
from each intervention group were given Version A for the Time 1 assessment, 
followed by Version B at Time 2 and Version A again at Time 3. During the test, 
participants were first required to read a series of ambiguous situations similar to 
those in the training. This time a title was given to each scenario to facilitate later 
recognition, and participants were asked to pay particular attention to them. Similar 
to the training, participants were asked to imagine that each situation was happening 
to them. However, this time the word fragment did not disambiguate the situation. 
For example: ‘Huge Party: One of the most popular kids at class is going to have a 
huge party at his house this Friday. Your friend calls and asks whether you are 
going. You go to facebook to see whether he has sent you an inv-t-tion (invitation).’ 
Likewise the comprehension question did not emphasise the emotional meaning of 
the situation: ‘Is one of the popular kids having a huge party this Friday?’ 
 In the subsequent recognition phase, participants were shown the titles of the 
scenarios again, each followed by 4 ‘recognition statements’. None of these 
statements used the exact words of the scenarios as previously presented but 
conveyed similar meanings. Two statements comprised ‘targets’ representing either a 
positive (‘You go to your profile and see that he has sent you an invitation’) or 
negative (‘You go to your profile and see he has not sent you an invitation’) 
interpretation. The other two statements, known as ‘foils’, were statements that 
conveyed similar emotional valence as the ‘targets’ but included information that 
was not explicitly given in the scenarios. The positive and negative foils for this 
sample item were, respectively, ‘You go to your profile and see that he has sent you 
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a friend request’ and ‘You go to your profile and see he has removed you from his 
list’. Participants were asked to rate the similarity of each sentence to the scenarios 
previously presented on a 4-point scale ranging between ‘1 = not similar at all’ and 
‘4 = very similar’. A positive interpretation bias would be indicated by higher ratings 
for the positive than negative targets. The foil statements were designed to 
differentiate whether the training specifically modifies interpretation styles or 
whether it facilitates a general response bias towards valenced information (Mathews 
& Mackintosh, 2000). Thus, higher ratings for positive than negative foils would 
represent a general bias favouring positive information. All materials were presented 
on computers with E-Prime 2.0 software, which automatically recorded responses. 
 
2.4.2 Measures for depression, anxiety, and affect 
 Three questionnaires were used; all were self-administered and each required 
only about 5 - 10 minutes to complete. 
 The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988) consists of two 10-item mood scales developed to provide brief 
measures of positive affect (PA) and negative affect (NA). Respondents rate the 
extent to which they are currently experiencing each particular emotion on a 5-point 
scale (1 = ‘very slightly or not at all’ vs. 5 = ‘extremely’). These are summed up to 
give a Positive Affect Score and a Negative Affect Score; each ranges from 10 to 50 
with higher scores representing higher levels of positive and negative affect 
respectively. Both scales have demonstrated acceptable reliability (Cronbach’s α = 
.84 - .90), although the test-retest reliability was within a lower range (r = .39 - .71). 
The convergent validity was good (r = .89 - .95). Whereas the NA scale was 
positively correlated with established mood measures such as the Beck Depression 
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Inventory and the Spielberger State – Trait Anxiety Scale (r’s ≥ .51), the PA scale 
was inversely correlated (though less strongly) with these measures (r’s ≥ .35). The 
low inter-correlation between the two scales (r’s ≥ .23) suggested reasonable 
discriminative validity and that the two scales are largely independent (Watson et al., 
1988). In addition to the acceptable psychometric properties reported above, it was 
deemed to be an ideal measure for this study as it has been used in clinical research 
(e.g., Blackwell & Holmes, 2010) and studies with young people (e.g., Lothmann et 
al., 2011) and is quick and simple to use. 
The Beck Depression Inventory, second edition (BDI - II; Beck, Steer, & 
Brown, 1996), is a 21-item scale measuring symptoms of depression validated for 
use with individuals aged 13 - 80. It is widely used both for clinical and research 
purposes, with scores indicative of severity of depression (0 - 13 = ‘minimum’; 14 – 
19 = ‘mild’; 20 - 28 = ‘moderate’; and 29 - 63 = ‘severe’; Beck et al., 1996). Robust 
reliability and validity have been established, with excellent internal consistency (α = 
.91 for outpatients and .93 for college students), test-retest reliability (r = .93), and 
strong correlation with other measures of depression such as the Hamilton 
Depression Rating Scale (r = .71) (Beck et al., 1996). 
The Spielberger State and Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, 
Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) consists of two 20-item scales measuring, 
respectively, anxiety at a specific moment (‘state anxiety’) and anxiety as a general 
trait (‘trait anxiety’). The State Anxiety and Trait Anxiety scores each range between 
20 and 80, with higher scores representing higher levels of anxiety. Although reports 
of the psychometric information for this measure are not as complete as for the 
measures above, there has been sufficient evidence to suggest that this is a reliable 
and valid instrument. The test-retest reliability for the Trait scale (r = .86) was higher 
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than that for the State scale (r = .40 - .54), reflecting the different nature of anxiety 
measured by the two scales (Rule & Traver, 1983; Spielberger et al., 1970). 
Concurrent validity was also evidenced by a high correlation with other anxiety 
measures such as the Manifest Anxiety Scales (r = .85).  
 
2.4.3 Measures for stress vulnerability 
 To examine training effects on stress vulnerability, participants’ responses 
under provocation of two types of stressors were observed. 
First, a controlled Experimental Stressor was used to observe participants’ 
emotional reaction to, and interpretation of, real life ambiguous situations. It was 
designed specifically for this study to be a real life analogue to the training materials. 
Experimental stressors used in previous studies were deemed to be unsuitable as they 
mostly targeted anxiety. After the Time 2 assessment of mood and interpretation 
bias, participants were told that the computer will now analyse their data. After a 
brief pause, an error message was shown on the computer screen saying that ‘We are 
sorry but we were unable to analyse your data. There is a possibility that some or all 
of your responses have not been properly recorded. This is a very unusual problem’. 
This message was designed to be ambiguous and could be interpreted in a negative 
or benign way. Participants’ interpretation of, and their emotional reaction to, this 
situation was subsequently measured. Specifically, participants were shown five 
possible explanations of why this error might have occurred and asked to rate on a 4-
point scale how likely they think each of the explanations is (‘1 = not at all likely’ 
vs. ‘4 = very likely’). Three of the options represented negative interpretations by 
implying that it might be the participant’s fault (‘You have not followed the task 
instructions correctly’, ‘You have accidently pressed a button to delete the 
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responses’, ‘You took too long to complete the task – time out’), whereas the 
remaining two were benign interpretations (‘There was a temporary power cut’, 
‘This was a random hardware error’). These statements were presented in a random 
order. To mask the true experimental purpose, the instruction was worded as a 
request to help experimenters to identify the problem ‘While we are trying to recover 
your data, please could you answer a few questions to help us to identify the cause of 
the problem.’ The average ratings for the positive and negative statements 
(separately) were used as the outcome variables. In addition, emotional responses 
were measured by a subset of five items drawn from the PANAS (two from the PA 
scale: Proud, Excited; and three from the NA scale: Distressed, Nervous, Guilty). 
These items were specifically chosen for their potential relevance to the situation. As 
in PANAS, participants were asked to rate the extent to which they experienced each 
emotion at the moment on a 1 to 5 scale (1 = ‘very slightly or not at all’ vs. 5 = 
‘extremely’). Average ratings were calculated separately for the positive and 
negative affect. Towards the end of the session, a positive message appeared to 
neutralise any negative emotions caused by the stressor (see ‘Ethical Considerations' 
below for details). This experimental stressor was used for an exploratory purpose; it 
was beyond the scope of this study to carry out formal validation prior to data 
collection. This will be further discussed in Chapter Four. 
In addition to the experimental stressor, this study also included a follow-up 
period to examine the training effects on participants under the provocation of 
naturally occurring stress. In the week following the training phase, participants were 
asked to rate how they felt on each day using a 5-point scale (1 = ‘completely 
miserable or stressed’; 2 = ‘a bit miserable or stressed’; 3 = ‘OK’; 4 = ‘quite good’; 5 
= ‘really good’). Participants were also asked to give a short description of any 
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events that ‘made you feel particularly good or bad’. These were reported via email 
or mobile phone text messages, according to individual preferences, with a reminder 
sent by the experimenter on each day at 18:45 ± 30 minutes. 
  
2.4.4 Feedback 
 To explore the acceptability of the CBM training and the other procedures 
used in this study, participants were asked to fill in a feedback form specifically 
developed for the purpose. This short questionnaire elicited both quantitative and 
qualitative comments. First, participants were asked to rate the extent to which they 
agreed with a list of three positive (‘fun’, ‘interesting’, ‘helpful’) and five negative 
(‘boring’, ‘harmful’, ‘dull’, ‘distressing’, ‘pointless’) descriptions of the study on a 
5-point scale (1 = ‘very slightly or not at all’ vs. 5 = ‘extremely’); these descriptions 
were selected to be consist with the themes that had emerged from participants’ 
comments in previous studies (Beard et al., 2011b; Brosan et al., 2011).  
Second, to establish whether participants were aware of the true purpose of the 
computer tasks, they were given a list of six possibilities (‘spelling’, ‘memory’, 
‘concentration’, ‘interpretation of situations’, ‘reading speed’, and ‘others’) and 
asked to ‘tick’ all the categories that they think the computer tasks aim to measure. 
Finally, the feedback form asked participants whether they would recommend their 
friends to participate in the study, what they liked best about the study, what they 
liked least about the study, and if they have any other comments (see Appendix E).  
 
2.5 Ethical Considerations 
 This study was approved by the Faculty of Medicine and Health Sciences 
Research Ethics Committee of the University of East Anglia (see Appendix F). The 
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recruitment procedure detailed above was intended to ensure that participants 
consented to the study entirely voluntarily without feeling pressured, and that they 
were fully informed. All data were kept confidential according to the requirements of 
the Data Protection Act. The intervention involved participants reading ambiguous 
situations and completing word fragments to resolve most of the situations in a 
positive (CBM group) or neutral (control group) way. The acceptability of this 
paradigm has been demonstrated in previous studies with clinical samples 
(Blackwell & Holmes, 2010; Brosan et al., 2011) and especially with this age group 
(Lau et al., 2011; Lothmann et al., 2011). Standardised brief self-rating scales were 
used for mood assessment; these have been widely used for research with both 
healthy volunteers and vulnerable samples. To neutralise any negative emotions 
caused by the experimental stressor, participants received the following positive 
message at the end of that session: ‘We have now successfully recovered all your 
data. It was due to a random hardware error. Please be assured that it is not due to 
any mistake on your part. We do apologise for any inconvenience. If you wish to 
discuss this further, please let the experimenter know.’ This message was reinforced 
in the final debriefing form provided at the end of the study (see Appendix G). No 
participant raised any concerns. Thus, although this stressor might have caused 
uneasiness to participants, the impact appeared to be short-lived and of a mild 
intensity as intended. Participants were advised to talk to their parents, teachers, or 
GP should they have any concerns over their wellbeing; they were also given 
information about local services for young people (see Appendix H). In the 
Information Sheet, participants were given contact details of the experimenter and 
her supervisor, as well as information about how to raise a formal complaint should 
they have any concerns.  
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2.6 Procedure 
 The overall procedure is shown in Figure 2.1. Participants met with the 
experimenter three times over two weeks. The first two meetings were held on 
consecutive days, although four participants (two from each group) attended them 
within the same day due to scheduling problem. At the first meeting (Time 1), 
participants were first required to complete the baseline assessment of interpretation 
bias using the recognition test and mood using the PANAS, STAI, and BDI-II. They 
then underwent the first session of the intervention (either CBM training or control 
condition). At the second meeting (Time 2), participants started by completing the 
second and final session of the intervention, followed by the post-intervention 
assessment of interpretation bias using the recognition test and mood using the 
PANAS. The other two measures, BDI-II and STAI, were not used here because 
these measures were not designed for repeated use within such a short period of 
time. After that the experimental stressor was administered. During the following 
week, participants were contacted on each day either by email or mobile phone text 
message (depending on indicated preference) to give daily self-ratings of mood and 
report any specific events. This procedure was explained to the participants at the 
end of the second meeting, both verbally and in writing (see Appendix I). The 
follow-up meeting took place one week after the intervention (Time 3), during which 
participants’ interpretation bias using the recognition test and mood were again 
assessed using the PANAS, STAI, and BDI-II. Participants were then asked to 
complete the feedback form, thanked for their participation and received the 
debriefing form. The tasks were self-paced; on average the first two sessions lasted 
for about 35 minutes each, and the last session about 20 minutes. Participants were 
79 
 
not paid, but they were entered into a lucky draw for a £100 retail voucher when they 
completed the study. 
All sessions were carried out by the same experimenter and took place in 
small groups (size ranging between 1 and 10) at a computer laboratory of the 
participants’ college during their free time. All computer tasks were completed using 
college computers. Participants were discouraged from talking to each other during 
the sessions or discussing the study outside the sessions, and the seating was 
arranged such that they could not observe each other’s responses. These were to 
protect confidentiality and to prevent potential collusion. Participants were blinded 
to the experimental condition to which they were assigned. Complete blinding of the 
experimenter was not feasible as the author was the only researcher in this study. To 
reduce experimenter bias, participants were given a sealed envelope which contained 
their Participant Identity Number and the group they were assigned to (labelled by a 
letter) and instructed to access the appropriate computer task independently. 
Likewise, the mood questionnaires were self-explanatory and thus did not require 
involvement of the experimenter. Thus, although the experimenter was present, 
participants completed all the components of the experiment autonomously. Notably, 
more than 10 participants sought advice from the experimenter when the error 
message appeared (as part of the experimenter stressor). In these instances, the 
experimenter responded with the same script by advising participants to follow the 
instructions from the computer with a neutral tone of voice and facial expression. 
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Figure 2.1. 
Procedure Overview 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Meeting 1 Time 1 Baseline Assessment 
Recognition Test, BDI-II, STAI, PANAS 
CBM Training Session 1 
 
Control Training Session 1 
 
CBM Training Session 2 
 
Control Training Session 2 
 
Time 2 Post-Training Assessment 
Recognition Test, PANAS 
Experimental Stressor 
Responses to the ‘error message’ 
Daily Mood Ratings and Stressful Events  
Reported via email or text messages 
Time 3 Follow-up Assessment 
Recognition Test, BDI-II, STAI, PANAS 
End of Study 
Feedback, Debriefing & Lucky Draw 
Meeting 2 
One Week 
Follow-up 
Meeting 3 
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2.7 Data Analyses 
Data analyses were conducted using SPSS v 18.0. Statistical significance was 
defined as p < .05 (two tailed). Assumptions for parametric tests, normality and 
homogeneity of variance, were checked across the entire sample and within each 
experimental group using histograms, Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests and Levine tests. 
Whenever normality assumption was violated, data were transformed to normality 
using methods that were appropriate to the specific distribution of the data. If 
unsuccessful, non-parametric tests were used. Boxplots were used to screen for 
outliers. Data analyses are briefly outlined below; more details will be provided in 
the relevant sections in the next chapter on Results. 
At the first stage of analyses, independent samples t tests were used to 
compare the two groups in terms of their baseline measures of mood and 
interpretation bias. Correlations between these baseline variables were also explored. 
Analyses were then carried out to examine the training performance. Each of the 
three outcome variables (accuracy and reaction time for comprehension questions, 
and reaction time for completing word fragments) was analysed using a repeated 
measures ANOVA with one between-subjects factor (Group: CBM vs. Control) and 
one within-subjects factor (Time: Session 1 vs. 2).     
To test Hypothesis I regarding the training effects on interpretation bias, 
similarity ratings for target and foil statements in the Recognition Tests were 
analysed using a repeated measures ANOVA with two between-subjects factors 
(Group: CBM vs. Control; Order: ABA vs. BAB) and three within-subjects factors 
(Time: T1 vs. T2 vs. T3; Type: target vs. foil; Valence: positive vs. negative).  
To test Hypothesis II regarding the training effects on mood, each of the 
outcome measures (BDI-II, STAI - State and Trait, PANAS - PA and NA) was 
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analysed with a repeated measures ANOVA with Group as the between-subjects 
factor and Time as the within-subjects factor. 
To test Hypothesis III regarding the training effects on stress vulnerability, 
the two groups were compared, using independent samples t tests or Mann-Whitney 
U Tests (for non-parametric data), in terms of their interpretation of and emotional 
responses to the stressor, as well as their daily mood ratings and the number of 
positive and negative events reported during the one week follow-up period. 
Finally, to explore the role of neuroticism, three analyses were performed: 
first, the above hypotheses were tested within a subgroup of participants with high 
neuroticism score (High N subgroup); second, this High N subgroup was compared 
with the Low N subgroup by repeating the above analyses with this variable of N as 
an additional between-subjects factor. Third, correlations were examined between N 
score and the training effects. 
Significant interactions were followed up by independent or paired samples t 
tests (or non-parametric equivalence, i.e., Mann-Whitney U Tests or Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank Tests) for comparing between-subjects and within-subjects factors 
respectively. Effect size (Cohen’s d) for the key findings was reported. 
Preliminary analyses revealed that one participant (CBM group) performed 
very poorly in both training sessions (accuracy for comprehension questions > 3 
standard deviations below mean). Low accuracy suggests that this participant might 
not have received the training as intended (either through disengagement or 
insufficient understanding of the task demand); this participant was therefore 
excluded from all analyses regarding training effects. Furthermore, one participant 
(Control group) did not attend Training Session 2 and was therefore excluded from 
the analyses for training performance. This participant, together with another seven 
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participants, did not attend Time 3 assessment. Out of these eight participants, three 
were from CBM group (8.1%) and five from Control group (13.5%); this group 
difference did not reach statistical significance, z = 0.75, p = .45. These participants 
did not differ from those who completed the study in terms of their demographic data 
and baseline measures of depression, anxiety, affect, or interpretation bias (all p’s > 
.08). The sample size for each stage of the analysis will be clearly indicated 
alongside results in the next Chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Results 
3.1 Baseline Characteristics  
The baseline characteristics for the CBM and Control groups are presented in 
Table 3.1. Transformation was carried out for BDI-II (by taking the square root) and 
PANAS-NA (by subtracting 10 and then taking the square root) to meet parametric 
assumption of normality. Independent samples t tests were used to compare the two 
groups in terms of their personality trait of neuroticism (N scores), baseline state and 
trait mood scores (BDI-II, STAI - State and Trait, PANAS - PA and NA), and pre-
training interpretation bias. The inter-correlations between these variables were also 
explored using Pearson’s correlation coefficients.  
Results reported in this section were based on the full sample of 74 
participants (37 per group). The two groups did not differ in baseline measures for 
personality trait, mood or interpretation bias (all p’s > .14; see Table 3.1). The mean 
BDI-II score in both groups was unexpectedly high even when compared with 
previous studies with vulnerable young people (e.g., Chan et al., 2007). As reported 
above, BDI-II data were non-normal (skewed to the right); medians were therefore 
more representative parameters to consider. As expected from a healthy volunteer 
sample, the median scores for CBM and Control (11 vs. 9) were both within the 
range of ‘minimum depression’ (Beck et al., 1996; see section 2.4.2). A pre-training 
interpretation bias index was computed by subtracting the mean similarity rating for 
negative targets from that for the positive targets, consistent with previous studies 
(e.g., Salemink & Wiers, 2011). Thus, positive scores indicated a tendency to 
endorse more positive than negative interpretations, vice versa for negative scores. 
Results revealed no group difference in pre-training interpretation bias (see Table 
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3.1). Although the scores for both groups were negative, they were not significantly 
different from zero (both p’s > .17) suggesting that the participants were not biased 
towards either positive or negative information before intervention.  
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Table 3.1 
Baseline Characteristics of the CBM (n = 37) and Control (n=37) Groups 
Variable CBM Control t p 
N Scores 5.49 (3.16) 5.24 (2.93) 0.34 .73 
Interpretation Bias  -0.12 (0.55) -0.01 (0.57) 0.86 .40 
BDI–II  14.11 (9.86) 11.84 (7.46) 0.94 .35 
STAI–S 39.24 (9.40) 38.00 (9.92) 0.55 .58 
STAI–T 44.59 (11.47) 43.62 (11.41) 0.37 .72 
PANAS–PA 28.97 (5.48) 28.86 (5.75) 0.08 .93 
PANAS–NA  15.08 (5.47) 13.73 (3.45) 1.48 .14 
Note. Values represent group means and standard deviations (in brackets). BDI-II 
and PANAS-NA are presented as raw scores, but transformed data were used for 
analyses due to violation of normality assumptions. 
 
The inter-correlations between the baseline characteristics are shown in Table 
3.2. As expected, the five mood scales were strongly correlated with each other in 
the expected directions; that is, participants who experienced more depressive 
symptoms also reported higher levels of state and trait anxiety and negative affect. 
The only exception was that PANAS-PA did not correlate with BDI-II or PANAS-
NA. The low correlation between the PA and NA scales of PANAS was consistent 
with the psychometric properties known for this measure (Watson et al., 1988; see 
section 2.4.2). In addition, N scores were correlated with all the mood measures and 
the baseline interpretation bias, such that participants with higher N scores 
demonstrated more depressive symptoms (BDI-II), higher levels of state and trait 
anxiety (STAI) and negative affect (PANAS-NA), less positive affect (PANAS-PA), 
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and notably higher levels of negative interpretation bias. Finally, negative 
interpretation bias was also associated with more depressive symptoms as well as 
state and trait anxiety.  
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Table 3.2  
Inter-correlation between Baseline Mood Scores and Interpretation Bias at Pre-training Assessment (N = 74). 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Neuroticism N/A - .47**  .67**   .49**   .77** - .35**    .23* 
2. Interpretation Bias  N/A      - .45** - .35** - .41**         .15        - .19 
3. BDI-II   N/A   .60**   .86**       - .16      .34** 
4. STAI-S    N/A   .69** - .33**      .65** 
5. STAI-T     N/A - .32**      .34** 
6. PANAS-PA      N/A  .07 
7. PANAS-NA          N/A 
Note. Values represent Pearson correlation coefficients (r). Transformed data were used for the analyses of BDI-II and PANAS-NA scores due 
to violation of normality assumption. * denotes statistically significant correlation p < .05, ** denotes significance p < .01 (two tailed). 
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Taken together, randomisation successfully created two groups that were well 
matched at baseline; the results reported below could therefore be attributed to 
training effects without being confounded by group differences at baseline. Given 
the known comorbidity between depression and anxiety symptoms (e.g., Stein et al., 
2001), it was not surprising that BDI-II and STAI scores were highly inter-
correlated. Both of these measures were also correlated with negative interpretation 
bias, in line with the cognitive models of anxiety and depression (see section 1.2). 
Neuroticism is a measure of an individual’s tendency to experience negative 
emotions (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1964; see section 1.2.1), and indeed N scores were 
strongly associated with higher scores on depression, anxiety and negative affect but 
lower scores on positive affect. One of the objectives of this study was to explore 
whether CBM could be developed as a preventive tool for adolescents at risk of 
depression by virtue of high neuroticism. The significant correlation between N 
scores and baseline negative interpretation bias confirmed that participants with a 
higher level of neuroticism had indeed shown a greater extent of interpretation bias, 
thus reinforcing the rationale behind testing the effects of CBM on individuals with 
high neuroticism (see section 3.6 below). 
 
3.2 Training Performance 
Training performance was measured by the accuracy for comprehension 
questions, reaction time for comprehension questions and reaction time for word 
fragments.  There was no specific hypothesis concerning these variables; however, 
analyses were carried out to explore whether participants responded differently to the 
CBM vs. Control training, and whether their performance changed across the two 
sessions. Each variable was analysed using a 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA with 
90 
 
Group as the between-subjects factor (CBM vs. Control) and Time as the within-
subjects factor (Session 1 vs. 2). The results reported in this section were based on a 
sample of 72 participants (36 per group). 
The percentage of correct responses to comprehension questions, and the 
reaction times for comprehension questions and word fragments are presented in 
Table 3.3. Both groups achieved high levels of accuracy for comprehension 
questions (≥ 92%), suggesting good compliance to task demands. This variable 
required transformation (by subtracting it from 1 and then taking the square root) 
before normality assumption was met. Results suggested significant main effects of 
time and group, such that better accuracy was observed in the second session, F 
(1,70) = 10.63, p < .01, and in the CBM group, F (1,70) = 16.01, p < .001. The 
interaction did not reach significance, F (1,70) = .01, p = .94.  
In addition to becoming more accurate, participants also improved in speed 
while responding to comprehension questions, as evidenced by a significant main 
effect of time, F (1,70) = 102.88, p < .001. There was no effect of group or 
interaction (both p’s > .21). 
Analyses on the reaction time for completing word fragments yielded a 
similar main effect of time, F (1,70) = 23.24, p < .001. Interestingly, a significant 
group by time interaction was found, F (1,70) = 8.49, p < .01, which was driven by a 
significant improvement in the CBM group, t (35) = 4.83, p < .001, but not in the 
Control group, t (35) = 1.59, p = .12. Nevertheless, there was no main effect of 
group, F (1,70) = .01, p = .94, suggesting that, when averaged across the two 
sessions, the two groups did not differ. 
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Table 3.3 
Training Performance: Accuracy for Comprehension Questions, Reaction Time for 
Comprehension Questions and Word Fragments of the CBM (n = 36) and Control (n 
=36) Groups 
 CBM Control 
% Correct Comp. Questions 
Session 1 
Session 2 
 
94.3 (5.5) 
96.3 (5.1) 
 
91.8 (4.3) 
93.8 (4.2) 
RT Comp. Questions (ms) 
Session 1 
Session 2 
 
2145 (497) 
1880 (498) 
 
2178 (487) 
1837 (353) 
RT Word Fragments (ms) 
Session 1 
Session 2 
 
1533 (392) 
1234 (191) 
 
1426 (372) 
1352 (244) 
Note. Values represent group means and standard deviations (in bracket). Percentage 
Correct for comprehension questions are presented as raw scores in this Table, 
although data of this variable were transformed to normality before parametric tests 
were applied. 
 
In summary, participants improved over time in their training performance 
both in accuracy and speed, suggesting a possible practice effect. The CBM group 
was more accurate in their responses to comprehension questions, which could 
indicate that either this group was more motivated or that the comprehension 
questions were easier to answer in this task. Higher accuracy in the CBM group also 
means that this group would have received more positive feedback (‘Correct’) in 
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training. Therefore, this group difference in training performance could potentially 
mediate the training effects (Lothmann et al., 2011); further analyses were conducted 
to clarify this effect (see section 3.7 Additional Analyses). 
 
3.3 Training Effects on Interpretation Bias (Hypothesis I) 
Hypothesis I stated that, compared with the Control group, the CBM group 
would show a greater increase in positive interpretations and / or a greater reduction 
in negative interpretations following intervention. Interpretation bias was measured 
by the similarity rating for the positive vs. negative Target statements in the 
Recognition Test across Time 1, Time 2, and Time 3. Similarity ratings for the foil 
statements were recorded as a measure of response bias. As mentioned above, two 
versions of the Recognition Test were used in a counterbalanced order (ABA vs. 
BAB). Similarity ratings were submitted to a repeated measures ANOVA with two 
between-subjects factors (Group: CBM vs. Control; Order: ABA vs. BAB) and three 
within-subjects factors (Time: T1 vs. T2 vs. T3; Type: target vs. foil; Valence: 
positive vs. negative). The results reported in this section were based on a sample of 
65 participants (33 from CBM, 32 from Control).  
As expected, targets were rated as more similar than foils, F (1,122) = 
149.43, p < .001. There was also a significant main effect of Time, F (2,122) = 3.18, 
p < .05, indicating that participants gave higher similarity ratings over time, and of 
Valence, F (2, 122) = 13.98, p < .001, with positive statements being rated as more 
similar than negative statements. However, these effects were qualified by a Time x 
Group interaction, F (2, 122) = 3.74, p = .03, such that the CBM group gave higher 
similarity ratings than the control group at baseline but not at later times, and a Time 
x Valence interaction, F (2, 122) = 14.10, p < .001, due to higher similarity ratings 
93 
 
for positive than negative statements at Times 2 and 3 but not at baseline. Most 
importantly, there were two significant interactions involving Type: Valence x Type, 
F (1, 122) = 72.42, p < .001, and Time x Type x Order, F (2, 122) = 17.38, p < .001. 
To further investigate these interactions involving Type, responses for foils and 
targets were analysed separately. This approach was in line with previous studies 
(e.g. Lothmann et al., 2011; Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000). The similarity ratings 
for the target and foil statements of the two groups are shown in Table 3.4. 
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Table 3.4 
Similarity Ratings for the Positive and Negative Target Statements of the CBM (n = 
33) and Control (n = 32) groups across the Three Time Points. 
 Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 
Targets - Positive    
CBM 2.44 (0.41) 2.53 (0.33) 2.59 (0.41) 
Control 2.33 (0.40) 2.57 (0.51) 2.62 (0.52) 
Targets - Negative    
CBM 2.57 (0.44) 2.37 (0.44) 2.37 (0.50) 
Control 2.34 (0.47) 2.30 (0.50) 2.35 (0.52) 
Foils - Positive    
CBM 2.19 (0.48) 2.38 (0.47) 2.36 (0.47) 
Control 2.04 (0.49) 2.30 (0.51) 2.33 (0.54) 
Foils - Negative    
CBM 2.12 (0.49) 1.92 (0.49) 1.98 (0.47) 
Control 1.79 (0.36) 1.78 (0.38) 1.83 (0.42) 
Note. Values represent group means and standard deviations (in brackets). Similarity 
ratings were based on a 4-point scale (1 = ‘not similar at all’ vs. 4 = ‘very similar’). 
 
3.3.1 Interpretation bias measured by target statements 
There was a significant Time x Valence interaction, F (2,122) = 10.10, p < 
.001, such that participants increased their ratings for positive targets, t (64) = 3.48, p 
< .01, d = 0.43, but reduced their ratings for negative targets, t (64) = 2.03, p < .05, d 
= 0.25, from Time 1 to Time 2. The increase in positive interpretation was still 
present at Time 3 (Time 1 vs. Time 3: t (64) = 4.23, p < .001, d = 0.52) but not the 
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decrease in negative interpretation (Time 1 vs. Time 3: t (64) = 1.57, p = .12, d = 
0.19). Consistent with these, positive targets were rated as more similar than 
negative targets after intervention at Time 2, t (64) = 2.77, p < .01, and at Time 3, t 
(64) = 2.67, p =.01, but not at baseline, t (64) = 1.00, p = .32. Thus, both 
interventions appeared to be successful in increasing positive and reducing negative 
interpretations, and the effect was still present one week later (Time 3). However, the 
crucial Time by Valence by Group interaction was not significant, F (2,122) = 0.12, 
p = .89, suggesting that CBM was not superior to Control (see Figure 3.1). 
In addition, there was a significant Time x Order interaction, F (2,122) = 
6.09, p < .01. As seen in Figure 3.2, participants who received the Recognition Test 
in the ABA order gave higher similarity ratings than those in the BAB order both at 
Time 1, t (63)=3.28, p < .01, and Time 3, t (63)=2.10, p = .04. In other words, target 
statements in Version A were consistently rated as more similar than those in 
Version B, presumably due to differences in the way statements were worded. Thus, 
it appeared that the two versions of the Recognition Test were not completely 
matched. Given that those allocated to the ABA order would have completed more 
Version A, it was not surprising that this group also demonstrated overall higher 
similarity ratings (main effect of Order: F(1,61) = 4.15, p < .05).  
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Figure 3.1 
Similarity Ratings for Positive and Negative Target (left) and Foil (right) Statements  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Bars represent group means ± the Standard Error of Mean (SEM) of the CBM 
and Control groups (n = 33 vs. 32). Similarity ratings were based on a 4-point scale 
(4 = ‘very similar’ vs. 1 = ‘not similar at all’). * denotes statistical significance p < 
.05, ** < .01 (two tailed).  
TARGETS FOILS 
** * 
* 
** 
** 
* ** ** 
* 
** 
** 
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Figure 3.2 
Similarity Ratings for Target (left) and Foil (right) Statements for Participants 
Receiving the Recognition Tests in ABA vs. BAB Order. 
 
Note. Bars represent group means ± SEM.  * denotes statistically significant 
difference p < .05, ** p < .01 (two tailed). 
 
3.3.2 Response bias measured by foil statements 
Similarity ratings for foil statements provided an indication of response bias. 
Results suggested a significant main effect of Valence, F (1,122) = 31.52, p < .001, 
and a significant Valence x Time interaction, F (2,122) = 13.98, p < .001. Follow-up 
analyses suggested that positive foils were rated as more similar than negative foils 
(i.e., a positive response bias) across all time points: Time 1, t (64) = 2.21, p = .03, 
Time 2, t (64) = 7.08, p < .001, and Time 3, t (64) = 5.23, p < .001. Notably, 
TARGETS FOILS 
** * * 
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participants showed both an increase in positive response bias, t (64) = 4.28, p < 
.001, and a reduction in negative response bias, t (64) = 2.01, p < .05, between Time 
1 and Time 2. The increase in positive interpretation was still present at Time 3 
(Time 1 vs. Time 3: t (64) = 4.49, p < .001) but not the decrease in negative 
interpretation (Time 1 vs. Time 3: t (64) = 1.04, p = .30). Thus, participants 
developed a greater response bias favouring the positive after the intervention, which 
persisted after one week (see Figure 3.1). 
Similar to the targets, there was a significant Time x Order interaction, F 
(2,122) = 4.72, p = .01, though with a different pattern. Here, higher similarity 
ratings were demonstrated in those receiving the ABA order at Time 2, t (63) = 2.01, 
p < .05, but not at Time 1 or Time 3 (both p’s > .58). Thus, it appeared that foil 
statements were rated as less similar in Version A than Version B (see Figure 3.2). 
 
3.3.3 Summary of results on interpretation bias 
Taken together, both CBM and Control groups demonstrated increased 
positive interpretations and reduced negative interpretations after intervention; the 
increase in positive interpretations was still apparent after one week. This enhanced 
positive bias was also observed in responses to foil statements suggesting that the 
intervention modified both interpretation and general response biases. However, 
inconsistent with Hypothesis I, there was no group difference.   
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3.4 Training Effects on Mood (Hypothesis II) 
Hypothesis II stated that following intervention the CBM group would show 
a greater reduction in depression, anxiety and negative affect, as well as a greater 
increase in positive affect than the Control participants. These outcomes were 
measured by a range of self-reported questionnaires; BDI-II and STAI (State and 
Trait) were used at Times 1 and 3, whereas PANAS (PA and NA) was used across 
all three time points. The hypothesis was tested by entering each of these variables 
into a repeated measures ANOVA with Group as the between-subjects variable and 
Time as the within-subjects variable. As mentioned above, BDI-II and PANAS-NA 
scores were transformed to normality before parametric tests were applied. These 
analyses were based on a sample of 65 participants (33 from CBM, 32 from 
Control). 
The group means and standard deviations of the following outcome measures 
are shown in Table 3.5. 
BDI-II: There was a significant main effect of Time, F (1,63) = 11.51, p < .001, 
such that BDI-II scores reduced over time across the entire sample. However, there 
was no significant effect of group, F (1,63) = .63, p = .43, or interaction, F (1,63) = 
.28, p = .60.  
STAI-S: Boxplots identified one outlier (CBM group), who was then excluded 
from analyses for this measure. Results showed a significant main effect of Time, F 
(1,62) = 4.51, p = .04, suggesting an overall increase in state anxiety. However, 
qualified by a significant interaction between Time and Group, F (1,62) = 4.86, p = 
.03, further analyses revealed that this increase in anxiety only occurred in the 
Control, t (31) = 3.08, p < .01, d = 0.54, but not in the CBM group, t (31) = 0.06, p = 
.96, d = 0.01. There was no significant effect of group, F (1,62) = .65, p = .42.  
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STAI-T:  There were no significant effects (all p’s > .22). 
PANAS-PA: There was again a significant main effect of Time, F (2,124) = 8.17, 
p < .001, suggesting an overall reduction of Positive Affect over time. There was no 
main effect or interaction with group (both p’s > .28). 
PANAS-NA: Boxplots revealed one outlier (CBM group) who was subsequently 
excluded for analysis of this variable. Results suggested a significant reduction in 
Negative Affect over time, F (2,122) = 5.83, p < .01. Crucially, there was a 
significant interaction, F (2, 122) = 3.10, p < .05. Paired samples t tests were 
performed to clarify the interaction: CBM group demonstrated a reduction from 
Time 1 to Time 2, t (30) = 5.32, p < .001, d = 0.96, and then an increase from Time 2 
to Time 3, t (30) = 2.09, p < .05, d = 0.37, although Negative Affect at Time 3 was 
still significantly lower than that at Time 1, t (31) = 2.05, p < .05, d = 0.36. By 
contract, no significant change between any time points was found within the 
Control group (all p’s > .09).  
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Table 3.5 
Measures of Depression, Anxiety, Positive and Negative Affect across the Three 
Time Points. 
 N Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 Results 
BDI-II      
CBM  33 13.24 (9.57) - 12.09 (11.34) Decrease 
Control 32 11.50 (7.16) - 9.63 (7.47) Decrease 
STAI-S      
CBM 32 38.03 (8.28) - 37.94 (10.23) No change* 
Control 32 37.16 (8.73) - 42.19 (10.81) Increase 
STAI-T      
CBM 33 43.76 (11.59) - 42.81 (13.34) No change 
Control 32 42.88 (11.12) - 42.31 (11.64) No change 
PANAS - PA      
CBM 
Control 
33 
32 
29.39 (5.50) 
29.16 (5.97) 
28.01 (7.09) 
26.72 (5.89) 
27.55 (8.62) 
24.81 (7.12) 
Decrease 
Decrease 
PANAS-NA      
CBM 32 14.06 (3.31) 11.87 (2.77) 13.16 (3.72) Decrease* 
Control 32 13.66 (3.26) 13.16 (3.30) 15.09 (5.64) No Change 
Note. Values represent group means and standard deviations (in bracket). BDI-II and 
PANAS-NA are presented as raw scores, but transformed data were used for 
analyses due to violation of normality assumptions. * denotes statistical significant 
group by time interaction p < .05 (two tailed). 
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In summary, there were mixed results regarding the training effects on mood. 
Notably, CBM group demonstrated a decrease in negative affect comparing with 
Control group, in line with Hypothesis II. Moreover, CBM group did not show the 
increase in state anxiety as seen in Control group. CBM also demonstrated a 
reduction in depressive symptoms measured by BDI-II; however, similar reductions 
were observed in Control participants suggesting that CBM did not offer superior 
effectiveness in reducing depressive symptoms. Neither group showed changes in 
trait anxiety. Unexpectedly, there was a general reduction in positive affect, probably 
reflecting boredom. These results will be further discussed in the next chapter on 
Discussion. 
 
3.5 Training Effects on Stress Vulnerability (Hypothesis III) 
Hypothesis III stated that participants in the CBM group would display a 
more positive response towards the experimental stressor (i.e. endorse more benign 
interpretation and report more positive affect and / or less negative affect). In 
addition, the CBM group would rate their mood more positive and report fewer 
stressful events during the follow-up period than the control group. Analyses 
reported in this section were carried out on a sample of 72 participants (36 per 
group). 
 
3.5.1 Responses to experimental stressor 
The outcome measures for the experimental stressor were Interpretation 
(benign vs. negative) and Affect (positive vs. negative). Data of these variables were 
shown to be non-normal even after transformation; therefore non-parametric tests 
were used. Results from the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Tests suggested that participants 
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rated the benign explanations of the stressor as more likely than the negative 
explanations (p < .01), and they also reported more positive than negative affect 
following the stressor (p < .001). However, results from the Mann-Whitney U Tests 
showed that the two groups did not differ in their interpretation of or emotional 
reaction to the stressor (all p’s > .14; see Figure 3.3). 
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Figure 3.3 
Responses to the Experimental Stressor  
 
Note. Bars represent group means ± SEM of the CBM (n = 36) and the Control (n = 
36) groups. Affect scores (left) were based on a 5-point scale with higher scores 
representing higher levels of positive and negative affect respectively. Ratings for 
the benign vs. negative explanations of the stressor (right) were based on a 4-point 
scale (1 = ‘not at all likely’ vs. 4 = ‘very likely’). 
 
3.5.2 Responses to day-to-day stress 
Responses to naturally occurring stress were assessed using a daily mood 
rating on a 5-point scale (1 = ‘completely miserable or stressed’ vs. ‘5 = really 
good’) and the number of positive and negative events reported on each day during 
the follow-up period. Again, daily mood ratings were shown to be non-normal even 
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after transformation. Results from the Mann-Whitney U Tests revealed no group 
difference in mood ratings on any day (all p’s > .61; see Figure 3.4).  
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Figure 3.4 
Self-reported Mood Ratings on Each Day of the Follow-up Period 
 
Note. Mood ratings were based on a 5-point scale (1 = ‘completely miserable or 
stressed’ vs. 5 = ‘really good’). Bars represent the means ± SEM of the CBM and 
Control groups (n = 36 per group). 
 
The average number of positive and negative events reported over the six 
days were analysed using a repeated measures ANOVA with Group (CBM vs. 
Control) as a between-subjects variable and valence as a within-subjects variable 
(positive vs. negative events). Results suggested a significant main effect of valence 
such that more positive than negative events were reported, F (1,70) = 6.21, p = .02. 
However, there was no effect of group or interaction (both p’s > .27) suggesting that 
the two groups reported similar amount of positive vs. negative events during the 
follow-up period. The number of events reported each day did not follow a normal 
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distribution (even after transformation). To explore whether the two groups differed 
on a daily basis, multiple Mann-Whitney U Tests were performed: No group 
difference was found in the number of positive and negative events reported on each 
day (all p’s > .26). Interestingly, results from the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Tests 
showed a significant effect of time for positive events (p = .01) but not negative 
events (p = .85). As seen in Figure 3.5, this appeared to be due to a considerably 
larger number of positive events reported on Day 1. Closer inspection of the 
descriptions of the events reported by participants revealed that Day 1 coincided with 
a festival (Guy Fawkes Night); many participants reported attending parties or other 
types of celebration. 
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Figure 3.5 
The Number of Positive (left) and Negative (right) Events Reported on Each Day in the One-week Follow-up between Time 2 and Time 3 
 
Note. Bars represent group means ± SEM of the CBM (n = 36) and Control (n = 36) groups. 
Positive Events Negative Events 
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3.5.3 Summary of results on stress vulnerability 
Overall, participants showed a positive response towards stress. They 
endorsed more benign vs. negative explanations of the error message used in the 
experimental stressor and reported more positive vs. negative affect after seeing the 
error message. During the follow-up week, they also reported more positive than 
negative events in day-to-day life. However, contrary to Hypothesis III, there was no 
group difference in the participants’ responses to stress. 
 
3.6 Role of Neuroticism 
One of the main objectives of this study was to explore whether CBM could 
eventually be developed as a preventive tool for adolescents at risk for developing 
depression. The following analyses were therefore performed to explore the role of 
neuroticism, which is a well-known personality risk factor for depression (see 
section 1.2). 
 
3.6.1 Analyses on high neuroticism subgroup 
This subsection of the investigation therefore focused exclusively on 
participants who scored high on neuroticism. The key analyses on training effects 
(i.e. sections 3.3 – 3.5) were re-run within the high neuroticism (High N) subgroup 
of the sample using the median as the cut-off (i.e., N score ≥ 6). Taking attrition into 
account, the following analyses on interpretation bias and mood were based on 32 
participants (16 per group) and analyses on stress vulnerability were based on 36 
participants (18 per group). A higher cut-off point of N score ≥ 8, corresponding to 
one standard deviation above mean, was considered but deemed inappropriate as the 
sample size (15) would be unlikely to be sufficiently powered to support the current 
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analyses. Analyses reported below were based on the same methodological approach 
as above (i.e., the same variable was analysed by the same test). 
Effects on Interpretation Bias: Results within this High N subgroup 
replicated the training effects on interpretation bias with a significant Time by 
Valence interaction, F (2, 56) = 4.65, p = .01, due to a significant increase in positive 
interpretations between Time 1 and Time 2, t (31) = 2.57, p = .02, which was still 
present at Time 3 (Time 1 vs. Time 3: t (31) = 3.04, p < .01). Unlike the full sample, 
no change in negative interpretation was observed (all p’s > .17). In addition, this 
High N subgroup endorsed more negative than positive interpretations at baseline, t 
(31) = 2.79, p < .01; this negative bias then disappeared after intervention at Times 2 
and 3 (p’s > .84). As in the full sample, there was no interaction with Group 
suggesting that CBM and Control were equally effective in inducing the above effect 
(see Figure 3.6). 
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Figure 3.6  
Similarity Ratings for Positive and Negative Target Statements within the High 
Neuroticism Subgroup (n = 32) 
 
Note. Bars represent the means ± SEM for responses towards negative and positive 
target statements. Similarity ratings were based on a 4-point scale (4 = ‘very similar’ 
vs. 1 = ‘not at all similar’). * denotes statistical significance p < .05, ** p < .01 (two 
tailed). 
 
Effects on Mood:  The mood scores within this High N subgroup are shown 
in Table 3.6. This subgroup resembled the full sample by showing an overall 
reduction in Positive Affect (main effect of time: F(2,58) = 4.34, p = .02) and no 
change in Trait Anxiety (all p’s > .37 ). This High N subgroup also showed a similar 
pattern of decrease in BDI-II and increase in STAI-S but these effects no longer 
reached statistical significance (Main effect of Time for BDI-II: F(1,30) = 2.92, p < 
* 
** 
** 
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.10; STAI-S: F(1,30) = 3.31, p < .08). The effect on Negative Affect in the full 
sample was not replicated here (all p’s > .39).  
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Table 3.6 
Measures of Depression, Anxiety, Positive and Negative Affect of the CBM and 
Control Participants (n = 16 per group) within the High Neuroticism Subgroup 
 Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 
BDI - II    
CBM 18.69(10.64) - 18.88(12.99) 
Control 14.31(7.85) - 11.88(8.92) 
STAI - State    
CBM 43.00(6.99) - 45.31(11.53) 
Control 40.88(9.11) - 45.81(9.60) 
STAI - Trait    
CBM 51.75(9.78) - 52.31(11.46) 
Control 49.13(10.47) - 48.25(11.26) 
PANAS - PA    
CBM 
Control 
28.50(5.56) 
27.44(6.64) 
28.07(5.86) 
28.13(6.93) 
26.63(9.07) 
22.63(7.03) 
PANAS - NA    
CBM 15.00(3.86) 14.27(5.39) 14.75(4.39) 
Control 14.50(3.60) 14.25(3.64) 15.75(5.99) 
Note. Values represent group means and standard deviations (in bracket). BDI-II and 
PANAS-NA are presented as raw scores, but transformed data were used for 
analyses due to violation of normality assumptions.  
 
Effects on Stress Vulnerability: Similar to the full sample, this High N 
subgroup reported more positive than negative affect following the experimental 
114 
 
stressor, z = 2.52, p = .01. However, they differed from the full sample by rating the 
neutral and negative explanations as equally likely, z = 1.23, p = .22. The 
interpretation of, and emotional responses to, the stressor did not differ between 
those who received CBM vs. Control (all p’s > .28). In the follow-up period, results 
revealed no group difference on the mood ratings on any day (all p’s ≥ .10) or the 
number of events reported (all p’s > .07). 
 
3.6.2 Comparison between high vs. low neuroticism subgroups 
While the above examined the training effects within the High N subgroup 
exclusively, this study was also interested in exploring whether neuroticism 
moderates the training effects.  To test this hypothesis, participants were classified 
into High N vs. Low N subgroups, again using median split of their N scores (i.e., N 
score ≥ 6 vs.  N score < 6), and the key analyses (sections 3.3 – 3.5) were re-run with 
Neuroticism (i.e., High N vs. Low N) as an additional between-subjects factor. This 
hypothesis would be supported if results yielded significant interactions between 
training effects and neuroticism. After discounting attrition, the following analyses 
on interpretation bias and mood were based on 65 participants (16 High N CBM, 16 
High N Control, 17 Low N CBM, and 16 Low N Control); analyses on stress 
vulnerability were based on 72 participants (18 per group). 
Interpretation Bias and Mood: There was a significant Valence by 
Neuroticism interaction, F (1,114) = 12.08, p < .01, due to High N participants 
endorsing less positive interpretations, t (63) = 2.63, p = .01, than the Low N 
participants. A significant main effect of N was also found across mood measures, 
such that High N participants demonstrated higher scores on BDI-II, F (1,61) = 
22.25, p < .001, STAI-S, F (1,61) = 27.09, p < .001, STAI-T, F (1,60) = 43.11, p < 
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.001, and PANAS-NA, F (1,60) = 10.15, p < .01, than Low N participants overall. 
These results were expected based on previous findings on neuroticism (e.g., Chan et 
al., 2007; see section 1.2).  However, neuroticism did not interact with training 
effects, thus there was no evidence to suggest that it acts as a moderator (see Table 
3.7). 
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Table 3.7 
Interpretation Bias and Mood of the High N (n = 32) and Low N (n = 33) Subgroups 
 Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 
Similarity Ratings for Positive Target 
High N 2.27(0.39) 2.46(0.41) 2.50(0.48) 
Low N 2.50(0.40) 2.64(0.43) 2.70(0.43) 
Similarity Ratings for Negative Target 
High N 2.57(0.49) 2.45(0.44) 2.47(0.56) 
Low N 2.35(0.42) 2.22(0.47) 2.26(0.42) 
BDI-II    
High N 16.50(9.46) - 15.38(11.52) 
Low N 8.39(4.76) - 6.52(4.15) 
STAI - State     
High N 41.94(8.06) - 45.56(10.44) 
Low N 33.36(6.35) - 35.61(9.67) 
STAI - Trait    
High N 50.44(10.05) - 50.28(11.36) 
Low N 36.42(7.55) - 34.84(7.84) 
PANAS-PA    
High N 27.97(6.05) 27.06(6.40) 24.63(8.24) 
Low N 30.55(5.10) 28.03(6.70) 27.73(7.52) 
PANAS-NA    
High N 14.75(3.68) 14.26(4.49) 15.25(5.19) 
Low N 13.03(2.53) 11.39(1.97) 13.15(4.27) 
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Stress Vulnerability: Limited by the non-parametric nature of most of the 
relevant variables, the neuroticism by training interaction could only be directly 
tested in the average number of events reported during the follow-up period. This 
analysis revealed no such interaction (all p’s > .34). Using the Mann-Whitney U 
Tests, High N participants were shown to report more negative affect following the 
experimental stressor and endorsed more negative interpretations of the stressor 
comparing with Low N participants (both p’s < .02; see Figure 3.7). 
During the follow-up week, High N participants also reported more negative 
events on two of the days (p’s ≤ .05; see Figure 3.8) although their daily mood 
ratings were similar to the Low N participants (all p’s > .10). 
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Figure 3.7 
Responses to the Experimental Stressor 
 
Note. Bars represent the mean ratings ± SEM of the High N and Low N Subgroups 
(n = 36 per group). Affect scores (left) were based on a 5-point scale with higher 
scores representing higher levels of positive and negative affect respectively. Ratings 
for the benign and negative explanations of the stressor (right) were based on a 4-
point scale (1 = ‘not at all likely’ vs. 4 = ‘very likely’). 
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Figure 3.8 
The Number of Positive (left) and Negative (right) Events Reported on Each Day in the Follow-up Period between Time 2 and Time 3. 
 
Note. Bars represent the means ± SEM of the High N and Low N subgroups (n = 36 per group).
Positive Events 
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3.6.3 Correlations between neuroticism and training effects 
Finally, correlation analyses across the entire sample of 74 participants were 
used to explore the relationship between neuroticism scores and the changes in 
interpretation bias and mood from before to after training. None of the correlations 
reached statistical significance (all p’s > .08) again suggesting that neuroticism does 
not act as a moderator of the training effects.  
 
3.6.4 Summary of results on neuroticism 
 Findings in this section revealed that participants with higher neuroticism 
scores had higher levels of negative interpretation bias, depression, anxiety, and 
negative affect than those who had lower neuroticism scores. They also appeared to 
be more vulnerable in the face of stress: they were more likely to interpret the 
experimental stressor in a negative way and reported more negative affect 
afterwards; they also reported more negative than positive events in day-to-day life. 
The effects of CBM on interpretation bias were replicated in these vulnerable 
participants (i.e., the High N subgroup), although most of the effects on mood 
disappeared in part due to the reduced sample size. However, the direct comparison 
between High N and Low N participants and the correlational analyses did not yield 
evidence to suggest that neuroticism acts as a moderator of training effects.  
 
3.7 Additional Analyses 
As reported in section 3.2 above, the CBM group was more accurate in their 
responses to the comprehension questions during the intervention. This might 
potentially mediate any group difference in training effects (Lothmann et al., 2011). 
To test this hypothesis, the outcome measures that were found to have a group 
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difference, namely State Anxiety and Negative Affect, were re-analysed with 
accuracy (measured by the percentage of correct responses to comprehension 
questions) added as a covariate. Results were mixed: While the effect on State 
Anxiety remained unchanged, the interaction in the Negative Affect was no longer 
significant (p > .10). Thus, it appeared that the superior effectiveness of CBM in 
reducing negative affect was in part due to this group being more accurate in 
responding to comprehension questions during training. This mediating effect will be 
further discussed in the next chapter on Discussion. 
 
3.8 Participants’ Feedback 
At the end of the last session, participants were asked to fill in a feedback 
form (see Appendix E). As seen in Figure 3.9, the two groups did not differ in the 
way they described the study. Overall, participants agreed with the positive 
descriptions to a greater extent than the negative descriptions.  
When participants were asked to guess the purpose of the computer tasks, a 
vast majority (94%) correctly indicated ‘interpretation of situations’ as the purpose 
of the computer tasks, more than half indicated ‘concentration’ (59%) and ‘memory’ 
(55%), and less than 10% selected ‘reading speed’ or ‘spelling’.  
Reassuringly, all but one participant (98%) said they would recommend their 
friends to participate in the study. 
When asked what their favourite part(s) of the study was, the most common 
replies were the questionnaires (20 participants; 30%) and that the study made them 
more aware of their feelings, personality, and / or the way they dealt with day-to-day 
situations (20 participants; 30%). Nine participants (14%) preferred the daily 
reporting of mood and events, whereas only five participants (8%) named computer 
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tasks as their favourite part(s) of the study. Interestingly, one participant (2%) 
mentioned the experimental stressor (‘the trick’) as the favourite part. Seventeen 
participants (26%) said they enjoyed the experience of participating in a psychology 
study, such as ‘the researcher is friendly’ and ‘the variety of tasks’, without 
mentioning any specific component of the study. 
When asked what their least favourite part(s) of the study was, a large 
majority of participants (49; 74%) mentioned the computer tasks as being repetitive, 
too long, somewhat confusing or that the scenarios were ‘odd’ or stereotyped. Three 
participants (5%) said that they worried that they may get the answers wrong; two 
participants (3%) said the questionnaires were ‘too personal’ or ‘ambiguous’; finally 
one participant (2%) said that ‘I wasn’t sure what it was for’.  
Participants were given space on the feedback form to leave ‘any other 
comments’. These comments largely echoed the themes that emerged in the 
responses to the questions reported above. On a positive note, many participants left 
a message saying ‘thank you for letting me take part’. 
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Figure 3.9 
Feedback from Participants 
 
Note. Bars represent the mean ratings ± SEM of the CBM and Control groups for each of the negative (left) and positive (right) descriptions 
based on a 5-point scale (1 = ‘very slightly or not at all’ vs. 5 = ‘extremely’).  
Negative Descriptions 
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3.9 Overall Summary of Results 
Inconsistent with Hypothesis I, CBM training did not show superior benefits 
in interpretation bias comparing with Control group. Both groups showed an 
increase in positive interpretations and a decrease in negative interpretations. Results 
regarding the effects on mood were mixed. Consistent with Hypothesis II, CBM 
group demonstrated a greater reduction in negative affect than Control group. CBM 
group also reported a reduction in depressive symptoms; however, similar reductions 
were observed in Control participants. Neither group showed changes in trait 
anxiety. Unexpectedly, Control participants reported an increase in state anxiety; 
there was also a general reduction in positive affect in both groups.  Encouragingly, 
some of the positive changes were still present one week after training, suggesting 
promising durability. However, the two groups did not differ in their responses to the 
experimental stressor and day-to-day stress, thus lending no support for Hypothesis 
III. Analyses on neuroticism suggested that participants with higher scores on this 
personality risk factor had higher levels of negative bias, mood symptoms, and stress 
vulnerability than those with lower scores. The effects of CBM on interpretation bias 
were replicated within this subgroup of High N participants. However, there was no 
evidence to suggest that neuroticism acts as a moderator of training effects. The 
effect size of the key findings was reported in the relevant sections above. Most of 
the effect sizes ranged between small to medium, except that a large effect size (d = 
0.96) was found for the reduction in negative affect in the CBM group.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Discussion 
4.1 Overview of Discussion 
The objectives of this study were two-fold. First, it aimed to further 
investigate the effects of CBM on cognitive bias, mood, and stress vulnerability in 
adolescents, following results from the literature review that highlighted the scarcity 
and methodological limitations of research in this age group. The key findings 
showed that the CBM group showed a greater reduction in negative affect compared 
with control group. In addition, the CBM group did not show the increase in state 
anxiety as seen in Control participants. However, CBM training did not show 
superior benefits in other outcome variables. Both groups displayed an increase in 
positive interpretations, a decrease in negative interpretations, a reduction in 
depressive symptoms, an increase in positive affect and no change in trait anxiety. 
There was no evidence to suggest that CBM reduces vulnerability to stress. Despite 
some patchy mood effects, overall this study has not provided strong evidence to 
support the effectiveness of CBM in promoting cognitive changes or reducing stress 
vulnerability in this age group.  
The second aim of this investigation was to explore whether CBM could be 
developed as a preventive tool for adolescents at risk for developing depression, in 
particular those who have high levels of neuroticism, a well-known personality risk 
factor for depression. A direct comparison between those who have high neuroticism 
scores vs. low neuroticism scores confirmed the expectation that neuroticism was 
linked to more negative interpretation bias, depressive symptoms, anxiety and 
negative affect. However, results did not suggest that neuroticism acts as a moderator 
of the training effects; in other words, there was no evidence to suggest that 
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participants with different levels of neuroticism responded differently to CBM. 
Indeed, analyses within the high neuroticism subgroup replicated the cognitive 
changes found in the full sample, although the mood benefits became less apparent, 
presumably due to a reduced sample size. 
 These findings will be considered in further details below (sections 4.2 – 
4.3), followed by a critique of the methodological issues (section 4.4). This chapter 
will then highlight the theoretical and clinical implications of the study with 
suggestions for future research directions (section 4.5 – 4.6) before it closes with the 
final conclusion (section 4.7). 
  
4.2 Effects of Cognitive Bias Modification in Adolescents  
  
4.2.1 Effects on interpretation bias 
The finding that both CBM and control led to an increase in positive 
interpretations is novel in a number of ways. First, only two of the previous studies 
on adolescents (Salemink & Wiers, 2011, 2012) had reported measuring pre-training 
interpretation bias using the Recognition Test; therefore, this study was only the 
third study to directly test the hypothesis regarding changes in interpretation bias 
from before to after training in this age group. Second, this study illustrated that 
changes in interpretation were driven by both an increase in positive interpretations 
and a reduction in negative interpretations. This greatly contributes to the existing 
literature as the direction of change had not been always clearly indicated. Third, this 
study provided evidence that the increase in positive interpretation was still 
detectable, with a moderate effect size, one week after training. This result is 
noteworthy given that only two sessions of training were provided. At the time of 
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writing, this was the first study to illustrate the durability of the training effects in 
this age group. 
One advantage of using the Recognition Test to measure interpretation bias is 
that it provides an indication of interpretation bias as well as general response bias. 
Indeed, the current results suggested that the training effect was extended to a 
general positive response bias, in line with previous findings (Lau et al., 2011; 
Lothmann et al., 2011).  
However, the key finding was that CBM did not outperform control 
condition in fostering positive vs. negative interpretation. This result appeared to be 
inconsistent with the previous CBM studies with adolescents suggesting the 
superiority of CBM to control in this outcome measure (Lau et al., 2011; Lothmann, 
2011; Salemink & Wiers, 2011, 2012). There are at least four possible explanations.  
One possibility is that CBM might have been more effective than the control 
in inducing positive interpretation as hypothesised, but that the effect was too small 
to be detectable in the current sample size. Indeed, many previous studies compared 
CBM training with ‘negative training condition’ where participants were coached to 
repeatedly resolve ambiguous situations in a negative direction (e.g., Lau et al., 
2011; Lothmann et al., 2011; Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000; Salemink et al, 2007a). 
Therefore, previous studies, including the two based on which the current sample 
size was determined (Lau et al., 2011; Lothmann et al., 2011), might have 
exaggerated the effect size of CBM. Indeed, a larger sample might be needed to 
detect the difference between CBM training and placebo control in this age group. 
For example, using a sample size of 170 (>80 per group), one adolescent study found 
that CBM is more effective in inducing positive interpretation compared with a 
placebo controlled group (Salemink & Wiers, 2011).  
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The second possibility is that that effect of CBM was limited by the lack of 
use of imagery. Research has shown that imagery enhances the effect of CBM 
(Holmes & Mathews, 2005; Holmes et al., 2006) and that children and adolescents 
are able to employ imagery when instructed (Harris, 2000; Kosslyn, Margolis, 
Barrett, Goldknopf, & Daly, 1990). Indeed, two of the previous CBM studies with 
adolescents (Lau et al., 2011; Lothmann et al., 2011) have included an imagination 
exercise before training; in particular, adolescents were instructed to close their eyes 
and imagine coming home after school and describe what they could see, smell, hear, 
taste, and touch. The present study has only used a brief imagery exercise, where 
participants were asked to imagine biting into a lemon. It is possible that a larger 
CBM effect could have been observed if further imagery exercise was involved. This 
limitation has also been acknowledged in another CBM study with adolescents 
(Salemink & Wiers, 2011). 
The third possibility is that, although control participants were not coached to 
disambiguate the situations in either a positive or a negative way, the task did not 
actively prevent participants from endorsing a positive interpretation in their own 
mind. Indeed, the current sample showed a natural positive response bias at baseline 
(see Results section 3.3.2); it is therefore possible that the control condition had 
simply reinforced this pre-existing positive bias. In other words, although both 
control and CBM were shown to increase positive interpretations, these cognitive 
changes might have been mediated by different mechanisms. If this hypothesis were 
true, this would mean that the control intervention in this study has not provided a 
sufficiently neutral condition for comparison. Future studies may consider using a 
control condition that coaches participants to make equal proportions of positive, 
negative, and neutral resolutions. For example, in one adolescent CBM study 
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(Salemink & Wiers, 2011), control participants were asked to resolve 30% of the 
scenarios in a positive way, 30% in a negative way, and 40% in a neutral way; CBM 
was shown to lead to more positive and fewer negative interpretations than control.  
Finally, it is possible that CBM does not offer additional benefit to placebo 
effect in the healthy adolescent population. This explanation is less likely given that 
the effect of CBM on interpretation bias has been robustly replicated in adult 
populations (see Introduction section 1.3) and more recently in adolescent studies 
(Lau et al., 2011; Lothmann et al., 2011; Salemink & Wiers, 2011, 2012). 
Nevertheless, CBM research with adolescents is still at an early stage, and, as 
discussed in the Introduction, given the developmental differences in cognitive 
processing we cannot necessarily expect the same pattern of results to emerge in 
response to training in adults as in adolescents (Blakemore, 2006, 2008; Lothmann et 
al., 2011). The current finding that CBM does not outperform control in inducing 
positive interpretations highlights that the effect of CBM in this age group is far 
from robust. 
 
4.2.2 Effects on depression, anxiety and affect 
 The most notable result was that CBM demonstrated with a large effect size a 
greater reduction in negative affect than the control intervention, and this mood 
benefit lasted for at least one week following intervention. This result was consistent 
with a previous study with adolescents (Lothmann et al., 2011). However, further 
analyses showed that this effect no longer reached statistical significance when the 
training performance was controlled for, suggesting that this mood effect in CBM 
group was at least in part mediated by the better training performance in this group. 
Better accuracy in the CBM group during training could indicate that either this 
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group was more motivated or that the comprehension questions were easier to 
answer in this task. Higher accuracy in the CBM group also means that this group 
had received more positive feedback (‘Correct’) in training; this increased 
encouragement may explain the greater reduction in negative affect in the CBM 
group (Lothmann et al., 2011).  
In addition, CBM group did not show an increase in state anxiety as seen in 
the Control group. This effect could not be merely attributed to the group difference 
in training performance, as confirmed by covariate analyses. A similar pattern of 
change in state anxiety (i.e., increase in control vs. no change in CBM group)  has 
been previously found in Salemink et al., 2009, although in this previous study 
participants were highly anxious individuals and the control condition involved 
making negative resolutions of 50% of the scenarios. One explanation offered by the 
authors was that the study coincided with an examination period; therefore the lack 
of change in state anxiety in the CBM group (in contrast with the increase in anxiety 
in control) might indicate a protective effect of CBM against the examination stress.  
While this explanation could not be completely ruled out in the present study, it is 
not likely to be a sufficient explanation for the whole pattern of results. In particular, 
this would be inconsistent with the overall reduction in depressive symptoms 
measured by BDI-II and the lack of group differences in responses to stress (both 
experimentally induced and naturally occurring). Instead, the current finding on state 
anxiety appeared to reiterate the possibility that the control condition was not 
‘simply doing nothing’; the current result seemed to suggest that a repeated exposure 
to unresolved ambiguous events (as in the control condition) could elevate anxiety. It 
should also be noted that the lack of change in state anxiety in the CBM group is 
consistent with a previous study with adolescents (Salemink & Wiers, 2011).  
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 Regarding depressive symptoms, both the CBM and control groups 
demonstrated a significant reduction one week following the intervention. Therefore, 
this study did not provide evidence to suggest that CBM offers additional benefits in 
reducing depressive symptoms. This was the first CBM study with adolescents to 
measure depressive symptoms using a validated questionnaire (BDI-II); therefore, 
this result should be treated as preliminary until further replicated. Review of the 
adult literature yielded mixed results: while some studies showed evidence for a 
reduction (e.g., Blackwell & Holmes, 2010; Lang et al., 2012), other reported no 
effects (Amir et al., 2010; Beard & Amir, 2008; Vassilopoulous et al., 2009). Taken 
together, there has not been consistent evidence to suggest that CBM could reduce 
depressive symptoms in adults or adolescents. 
Neither group reported changes in their trait anxiety. This construct was 
intended to measure anxiety as a relatively stable trait, and therefore theoretically it 
was unlikely to be changed by two sessions of training. Indeed, previous studies had 
not always reported changes in trait anxiety (e.g., Beard & Amir, 2008; Hayes et al., 
2010). Whenever changes in trait anxiety were implicated, they tended to be 
observed in studies that involved a higher dose of CBM training (four sessions or 
more; e.g., Brosan et al., 2011; Lang et al., 2012; Mathews et al., 2007; Salemink et 
al., 2009).  
 An unexpected finding was the gradual decrease in positive affect over the 
course of the experiment. This might reflect an increasing sense of boredom, a theme 
that emerged in the participants’ feedback, and indeed more than two-thirds of the 
participants described the study as at least ‘a little’ boring. Indeed, the positive affect 
scale required participants to give a rating of feelings such as ‘interested’, ‘excited’, 
‘enthusiastic’, ‘alert’, and ‘inspired’. It was not surprising that these feelings reduced 
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after the sense of ‘novelty’ of participating in a research study wore off. Consistent 
with this hypothesis of boredom, a previous study also found that participants 
reported more negative feelings during the second half of the CBM training 
(Salemink et al., 2009). 
Taken together, this study yielded mixed results regarding the effects of 
CBM on mood. Previous CBM studies with adolescents have yielded patchy results 
regarding the effects on mood; their results were further limited by the narrow set of 
outcome measures used in these studies. So far, only two adolescent studies have 
found some evidence for mood changes (Lau et al., 2011; Lothmann et al., 2011) but 
in both cases the effect might have been exaggerated because positive training was 
compared with negative training. In addition, these studies only showed changes in 
positive and negative affect using non-validated visual analogous scales. Salemink & 
Wiers, 2011 did measure state anxiety using a validated questionnaire but found null 
results. When adult studies on CBM were reviewed (see section 1.3), the mood effect 
was equally patchy and inconsistent. Whether CBM changes mood is indeed a 
complex question, involving multiple mediating and moderating mechanisms that 
need to be clarified in future studies. 
   
4.2.3 Effects on stress vulnerability 
 Stress vulnerability was included in this study as an outcome measure. 
Specifically, the effects of the training were tested under the provocation of an 
experimental stressor and naturally occurring stressors in the follow-up period. 
Results suggested that participants reported more positive than negative affect 
following the experimental stressor, and they also tended to interpret the ambiguous 
error message used in the stressor in a neutral rather than negative way. These 
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cognitive and emotional responses suggest resilience to stress, although in the 
absence of a group difference it was unclear whether this was due to the intervention. 
A baseline measure would have been helpful in clarifying this, but one was not 
included as this stressor was still at the piloting stage of development. From an 
ethical point of view the results show that the stressor did not cause long-term 
harmful effects on participants. However, from an experimental point of view, they 
raise doubts as to whether the stressor was sufficiently intense to be a sensitive 
measure of stress vulnerability. The current finding regarding the null effect of CBM 
on stress reactivity is consistent with a volume of previous studies reporting that 
CBM has no effect on responses to stressors (e.g., Hertel et al., 2011; Salemink et 
al., 2009; Steinman & Teachman, 2010; Teachman & Addison, 2008). A small 
number of studies did yield supportive evidence; for example, CBM has been shown 
to protect participants from mood deterioration when challenged by a stress task 
(Wilson et al., 2006) or negative mood induction (Holmes, Lang, & Shah, 2009). 
However, many other studies that provided supportive evidence for the effects on 
stress reactivity only illustrated that CBM training reduced anticipatory anxiety in 
response to imagined upcoming stressful situations; it was unclear from these studies 
whether the benefits would translate into reduced actual anxiety upon the situation 
(Hirsch, Mathews, & Clark, 2007; Murphy et al., 2007; Vassilopoulous et al., 2009). 
Overall studies that employed a stressor varied a great deal in terms of the nature of 
the stressor and its outcome measures, rendering it difficult to compare across these 
findings. In light of these mixed findings, it is prudent to conclude that so far there 
has not been strong, consistent evidence to suggest that CBM is effective in reducing 
negative emotional responses to stress. It should also be noted that this study was the 
first to test this hypothesis in adolescent population.  
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 Similar to the results for the experimental stressor, there was no evidence to 
suggest that CBM offered protection against naturally occurring stressors. The two 
groups gave similar daily mood ratings during the one week follow-up period and 
reported similar amounts of positive and negative events on each day. There was an 
overall tendency to report more positive than negative events, which could be due to 
the cognitive changes seen in both groups. However, this could not be directly tested 
due to the absence of a baseline measure. To be clinically useful, the effects of CBM 
need to be established outside the laboratory; despite the methodological 
inadequacies, this outcome measure represents an important first step in testing this 
hypothesis.  
 
4.3 Vulnerability to Depression and Cognitive Bias Modification 
The second objective of this study was to explore whether CBM could be 
developed as a preventive tool for adolescents at risk of developing depression. 
Therefore, participants with higher levels of neuroticism, a well-known risk factor 
for depression, were selected as a subgroup for further analyses. Results with this 
subgroup largely resembled the overall findings with the full sample, although some 
of the mood effects no longer reached statistical significance, presumably due to the 
reduced sample size. Notably, however, the changes in interpretation bias in this 
subgroup seemed to follow a different pattern. Whereas the full sample changed 
from no interpretation bias to a positive interpretation bias after training, the high 
neuroticism subgroup changed from a pre-existing negative interpretation bias to no 
interpretation bias. This pre-existing negative interpretation bias was expected based 
on previous research on neuroticism (Alloy et al., 2006; Salemink & van den Hout, 
2010), and this difference seems to imply that a higher dose of training will be 
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required to bring about the same level of positive interpretation biases in this 
vulnerable subgroup. In addition, the cognitive changes observed in the high 
neuroticism subgroup were mainly driven by an increase in positive interpretation; 
the decrease in negative interpretation observed in the full sample was not replicated 
in the high neuroticism subgroup. This may imply that the tendency to make 
negative interpretations was more resistant to change in vulnerable individuals. If 
this were true, this would lead to major implications for the potential of CBM to be 
used as a preventive tool. Further studies should prioritise testing this hypothesis.  
In a secondary analysis, participants with high and low neuroticism scores 
were compared directly. The current study defined high vs. low neuroticism using a 
median split. This method is widely used in previous research (Hertel et al., 2011; 
Lau et al., 2011; Salemink & Wiers, 2011). Neuroticism is a stable personality trait 
that is highly predictive of subsequent depression; it has been estimated that an 
increase by one standard deviation in the neuroticism score carries a hazard ratio for 
a depressive onset of 1.72 (Kendler et al., 2004). Thus, the mean difference of 
neuroticism scores between the high and low neuroticism subgroups of this study 
(7.79 vs. 2.81), corresponding to 1.64 standard deviation units, represented more 
than two-fold difference in risk for depression. Indeed, results confirmed that high 
neuroticism was associated with more negative cognitive bias, depressive symptoms, 
and negative affect. These were consistent with the known characteristics of 
neuroticism (Chan et al., 2007; Eysenck & Eysenck, 1964; Kendler et al., 1993, 
2002, 2006a, 2006b), and further suggested that the median split had successfully 
created two groups that had significant differences in risk for depression. However, 
there was no evidence to suggest that the level of neuroticism moderated the effects 
of the interventions.  
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While neuroticism is a robust risk factor for depression, it has also been 
found to predict anxiety. For example, in a report based on a large sample of 
undergraduate students, a combination of high neuroticism and low extraversion was 
found to predict both depression and anxiety prospectively in three years (Gershuny 
& Sher, 1998). Sexton, Norton, Walker, & Norton (2003) further suggested that 
neuroticism is directly associated with symptoms of obsessive compulsive disorder, 
panic disorders and general worry; neuroticism was also found to predict anxiety 
symptoms through the mediation of anxiety sensitivity and intolerance of 
uncertainty. However, these results were based on non-clinical participants with 
cross-sectional measures rather than prospective measures. Nevertheless, these 
results were largely in line with previous theoretical models and empirical data 
suggesting neuroticism as a ‘higher-order’ factor that influences the development of 
a range of anxiety disorders (Barlow, 2000; Brown, Chorpita, & Barlow, 1998; 
Craske, 1999; Norton, 2002). 
Hence, the current effects of CBM observed in high neuroticism subgroup 
may not be specific to depression. Indeed, this study found that, in addition to more 
depressive symptoms, the high neuroticism subgroup also had higher state and trait 
anxiety scores than the low neuroticism subgroup (see Results section 3.6.2). This 
was expected due to the known co-morbidity between depression and anxiety (Stein 
et al., 2001). Indeed, the co-morbidity issue has been a longstanding challenge to 
experimental design; studies that investigated anxiety or depression (or the 
vulnerability to these disorders) often had participants with elevated symptoms of 
both. For example, in a CBM study on social anxiety, Beard & Amir (2008) 
recruited participants based on high social anxiety scores; however, the mean 
baseline BDI score of the sample was above 20 indicating moderate levels of 
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depression. Similarly, in a study that investigated interpretation biases in girls at risk 
for depression based on parental history of depression, the authors acknowledged 
that the participants might also be at risk for developing anxiety or other types of 
psychopathology (Dearing & Gotlib, 2009).  
In hindsight, one way to disentangle the effects on anxiety vs. depression 
could be to exclude participants with high scores on trait anxiety; however, this 
might result in a vulnerable sample that is arguably less typical. Future studies could 
consider using a risk factor that is more specific to depression. However, selecting a 
specific risk factor is itself a challenging task; this limitation was echoed by previous 
studies using other risk factors (e.g. parental history for depression, Dearing & 
Gotlib, 2009). Alternatively, future studies could consider using a longitudinal 
design involving a long term follow-up of vulnerable adolescents to differentiate the 
effects of CBM on risk for depression vs. anxiety. 
 
4.4 Critique of the Methodology 
 The findings of the study should be considered in the context of the 
methodological strengths and weaknesses.  
 
4.4.1 Sample 
The current sample consisted of 16-18 year old adolescents recruited from a 
local sixth form college. Similar to many previous studies (e.g., Beard & Amir, 
2008; Blackwell & Holmes, 2010; Brosan et al., 2011; Hirsch et al., 2009; Lang et 
al., 2012; Mathews et al., 2007; Teachman & Addison, 2008), the sample was 
predominately female and white, and therefore the results may not necessarily be 
generalizable to the wider adolescent population. Indeed, gender differences in the 
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effects of CBM have been implicated previously (e.g., Lothmann et al., 2011); 
however, this could not have been tested in the present study due to the small 
number of male participants.  
This study sought to exclude those who had any current or past diagnosed 
psychological disorders as these individuals might represent a different population to 
the one being targeted here. Nevertheless, on average, the sample seemed to have an 
unexpectedly high score on the baseline measure of depression even comparing with 
previous studies with vulnerable volunteers (e.g., Chan et al., 2007). Although the 
median score was within the range of ‘minimum depression’, 24 (32%) participants 
reported a score above the conventional clinical cutoff point indicating depression 
(i.e., BDI-II > 13; Beck et al., 1996). These participants were not excluded because 
BDI-II cannot be used alone as a diagnostic tool. In hindsight, it might have been 
helpful to use a structural clinical interview to exclude participants with significant 
depressive symptoms during recruitment. This may reflect a volunteer bias such that 
individuals who experience more emotional disturbances may be more interested in 
trying to learn more about their problems through participating in a psychology 
research study. The level of depressive symptoms may act as a moderator for the 
effects of CBM; this hypothesis was not tested here as it was beyond the scope of the 
study. 
Randomisation was appropriately used and resulted in two groups that were 
well matched in terms of baseline characteristics. This enabled this study to make 
conclusions regarding the effects of CBM without being confounded by irrelevant 
group differences at baseline. 
The sample size was determined using a formal power calculation based on 
two previous studies with adolescents using similar training materials (Lau et al., 
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2011; Lothmann et al., 2011). However, the effect size in these studies could have 
been over-estimated because CBM was compared against a negative training 
condition where participants were coached to repeatedly endorse negative 
interpretations. Therefore, the current sample may not have been adequately powered 
to detect some of the more subtle effects of CBM. Indeed, some of the key analyses 
were based on a reduced sample due to attrition, although the overall attrition rate in 
this study (11%) was comparable with previous studies (see Beard, 2011 for a 
review). 
This study also provided useful information about the number of adolescents 
needed to be screened to recruit a given sample size. This study was advertised to all 
the students in a sixth form college. However, only 8% of the students expressed an 
initial interest in participating by completing the screening questionnaire. Out of 
these potential participants, 50% consented to take part. Future studies should take 
this information into consideration when planning recruitment. 
To explore the effects of CBM in adolescents at higher risk of developing 
depression, those who scored above the median on the neuroticism scale were 
selected to represent a vulnerable subgroup. Neuroticism was chosen as an index of 
risk due to its known predictive power for depression (Kendler et al., 2002, 2006a, 
2006b) and association with negative cognitive biases (Chan et al., 2007; Salemink 
& van den Hout, 2010). Indeed, the high neuroticism subgroup was found to have 
higher levels of negative interpretation bias and depressive symptoms than their 
fellow participants who had lower neuroticism scores, suggesting that the median 
split had successfully created two groups that had significant differences in risk. 
Future studies should consider using more extreme cut-off points, as in some of the 
previous studies (e.g. N score ≥ 8 vs. N score ≤ 3; Chan et al., 2007, 2008a, 2009). 
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This would further enlarge the difference in risk between the two groups, thereby 
increasing the sensitivity of the comparison to detect differences due to neuroticism. 
These cut-off points were deemed unsuitable in the current study given the current 
sample size.  In addition, as discussed above, neuroticism has been indicated as a 
risk factor for anxiety as well as depression. Therefore, the current effects of CBM 
observed in the high neuroticism subgroup could be interpreted in the context of a 
general vulnerability to mood disorders.   
 
4.4.2 Design and outcome measures 
The current study adopted a repeated measures between-groups design, 
providing a rich set of data allowing comparisons both across time and between 
CBM and a matched control intervention. By contrast, many previous studies were 
limited by a lack of baseline assessment (Lau et al., 2011; Lothmann et al., 2011) or 
a lack of control group (Blackwell & Holmes, 2010; Brosan et al., 2011; Steel et al., 
2011; Turner et al., 2011) rendering it difficult to establish the exact nature of change 
resulting from CBM. In this respect, this study in particular surpassed the four 
previous studies with adolescents. Specifically, baseline interpretation bias was not 
measured in two of the studies (Lau et al., 2011; Lothmann et al., 2011) and mood 
was only measured by unstandardized visual analogue scales (Lau et al., 2011; 
Lothmann et al., 2011) or one single measure (i.e., STAI; Salemink & Wiers, 2011, 
2012). The current study greatly expanded the range of outcome measures including 
standardised questionnaires for depression, state and trait anxiety, as well as positive 
and negative affect. All of these were measured before and after intervention, 
although the measures for depression and anxiety were only used at baseline and one 
week following training because these measures were not intended to be used 
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repeatedly within a short period of time. The Time 3 assessment was particularly 
valuable in establishing the durability of the training effects, especially since the full 
range of outcome measures were repeated at this point. 
Interpretation bias was measured by the recognition test, a measure that has 
been widely used in CBM studies. It was based on the original task (Mathews & 
Mackintosh, 2000), specifically adapted and validated for use in adolescents (Lau et 
al., 2011; Lothmann et al., 2011). To minimise practice effects and increase 
engagement (through greater variety), two versions of the test were used; one of 
these was newly developed and obtained through personal communication with one 
of the key researchers in CBM research with adolescents (J. Lau). However, our 
results showed that the two versions were not completely matched, presumably due 
to differences in wording. This difference has not affected the findings of the current 
study, due to the appropriate use of counterbalancing. However, further work is 
necessary to improve the matching of the two versions before they can be used in 
future studies.  
A particular novelty of this study was the measurement of stress vulnerability 
both inside the laboratory and in ‘the real world’, which involved piloting a 
controlled experimental stressor specifically designed for the purpose and asking 
participants to report their mood and events on a daily basis through mobile phone 
text messages. 
Experimental stressors used in previous studies mostly targeted anxiety. This 
study aimed to explore the effects of CBM on vulnerability to depression; a stressor 
was therefore specifically developed to capture the type of negative biases relevant 
to depression. In particular, cognitive theories emphasise the role of cognitive biases 
towards a negative sense of self (e.g., ‘it is all my fault’) in maintaining depressive 
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symptoms such as self-criticism and sense of worthlessness (Beck et al., 1979). 
Based on this theoretical understanding of depression, the current stressor therefore 
comprised an ambiguous error message that could be taken to imply that participants 
may have done something wrong resulting in the loss of data (e.g., ‘press the wrong 
button’ and ‘take too long to respond’). This error message was also conceptualised 
with the intention to provide a real life analogue to the CBM training. In other 
words, by creating an ambiguous situation similar to the scenarios used in the 
intervention, the error message provided a means to directly examine whether the 
increase in positive interpretations shown in the recognition test was translatable to 
an increased tendency to interpret real life ambiguous situations in a positive way. It 
was also designed to be age appropriate and fit into the context of the experiment. 
Some participants (> 10) asked the experimenter for advice when they saw the error 
message, suggesting that the error message was reasonably believable. Apart from 
this face validity, a formal validation procedure was not carried out as this stressor 
was only at a piloting stage. Furthermore, participants’ emotional responses were 
only measured by a simple Likert scale; further studies should develop more 
sophisticated ways to give a more accurate measure. Thus, although the stressor has 
high potential to be a useful instrument to assess stress vulnerability, further work is 
needed to establish its reliability and validity before it could be used as a robust 
experimental tool. 
 In addition to the experimental stressor, this study further explored the effects 
of CBM on responses to real life stress by asking participants to rate their mood and 
report events on a daily basis during the week that followed the training. Again, the 
mood ratings were based on a simple Likert scale; the precision could be enhanced 
by using more standardised mood measures. The events reported over one week 
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provided very valuable information regarding the day-to-day life of adolescents; 
future CBM research should refer to these qualitative descriptions when developing 
further age-appropriate training materials. An inspection of the descriptions of these 
events highlighted the importance of academic work (e.g. meeting deadlines for 
assignments), social participation (e.g., going to parties), romantic relationships, and 
pursuits of interests (e.g., music, drama, and sports) in contributing to the daily 
emotional experiences of young people. Encouragingly, these same themes had 
already been featured in the CBM training for adolescents (Lothmann et al., 2011) 
including the current study. However, these descriptions also highlighted 
considerable individual differences, arguing for the advantage of using 
individualised training materials (Beard, 2011). In support of this, on the feedback 
form, some participants did comment that they found some of the training scenarios 
irrelevant to themselves. Furthermore, there is room for improvement in the clarity 
of the instructions; participants could be given more specific guidelines as to the 
amount of detail they should report. Interestingly, about half of the participants chose 
to give these daily ratings and events through mobile phone text messages rather 
than email. The response time was prompt compared with email, in many cases 
almost instant. The compliance rate was high, minimising loss of data. Feedback 
suggested that participants not only found this part of the experiment acceptable, 
many of them found it enjoyable and engaging. This study is valuable in establishing 
the acceptability and feasibility of using mobile phone text messages as a means of 
collecting data, which has particularly high potential for future research with 
adolescents. 
Similar to many previous studies, the outcome measures for mood in this 
study relied heavily on self-reported measures, which were potentially susceptible to 
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response bias and demand characteristics. Future studies should consider broadening 
the range of outcome measures to include more objective scales. Given that this 
study aimed to explore the potential for CBM to be used as a preventive tool in 
individuals who are vulnerable but not currently depressed, it would have been 
helpful to include instruments such as those employed in positive psychology 
(Seligman, Steen, Park, & Peterson, 2005). This would help investigating the effects 
of CBM beyond the measurement of symptoms.  
 
4.4.3 Intervention 
This study compared CBM training with a placebo-controlled condition. In 
contrast to two of the four previous CBM studies with adolescents (Lau et al., 2011; 
Lothmann et al., 2011) where positive training was compared with negative training, 
the current study provided a more accurate indication of the effectiveness of CBM 
training. However, as discussed above, the control condition used in this study might 
not be sufficiently ‘neutral’ as it might have reinforced participants’ pre-existing 
biases. By contrast, two previous CBM studies with adolescents asked control 
participants to resolve 30% of the scenarios in a positive way, 30% in a negative 
way, and 40% in a neutral way (Salemink & Wiers, 2011, 2012). This method might 
be more appropriate as a placebo-control. Notably, this study surpassed all four 
previous studies with adolescents by delivering the training and assessing its effects 
beyond a single session. Specifically, two sessions of training were provided, 
determined based on both theoretical and practical considerations. Although a 
substantial body of literature has shown that one single session of training is 
sufficient in inducing changes in cognition and / or mood, larger effect sizes and 
longer durability tended to be found in studies using multiple sessions (Beard, 2011). 
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From a feasibility perspective, the number of sessions was decided upon after taking 
into account the college’s concerns over the burden to students (e.g., time) and 
availability of resources (e.g., limited computing facilities). Although the current 
effect sizes may be limited by the relatively small dose of training, this study is 
valuable in establishing the acceptability and feasibility for two sessions of training 
in this population of adolescents.  
 
4.4.4 Acceptability and ethical considerations 
This study contributed to the emerging evidence for acceptability of CBM 
through the collection of participants’ feedback (e.g., Beard et al., 2011a, 2011b; 
Blackwell & Holmes 2010; Brosan et al., 2011), and was the first to systematically 
report feedback by adolescents. The feedback form (see appendix E) included a 
rating scale to provide a quantitative measure of the level of acceptability, while at 
the same time eliciting qualitative feedback by asking participants to indicate their 
favourite and least favourite parts of the experiment as well as providing space for 
participants to leave ‘any other comments’. This was comprehensive, although in 
hindsight it would have been helpful to ask whether participants believed in the error 
message (i.e., the experimental stressor). Despite the overall positive feedback 
received from participants, some of the negative feedback such as ‘repetitive’ and 
‘somewhat boring’ need to be addressed in the future development of CBM.  
The most unexpected finding of this study was that control participants 
reported an increase in state anxiety, suggesting that repeated exposure to ambiguous 
unresolved scenarios could have a potential negative impact on mood. Further 
investigation is warranted in clarifying this effect and its ethical implications.  
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Finally, it is positive to note that the experimenter has liaised closely 
throughout the course of the study with the members of staff from the college where 
recruitment and data collection took place. Specifically, the Head of Psychology was 
consulted from an early stage of the research regarding the acceptability and 
feasibility of the study; staff members from the IT department were also consulted 
regarding the best way to manage data protection while using the college’s 
computing facilities. The experimenter has arranged to disseminate the findings to 
the participants by giving a presentation at the college. These efforts in maximising 
the involvement of the public in the design and execution of research are in line with 
the guidelines for good research practice (Medical Research Council, 2005). 
 
4.5 Theoretical and Clinical Implications 
Notably, the two groups did not show differential cognitive changes but yet 
they displayed different changes in negative affect and state anxiety. This was 
largely in line with previous research suggesting that state mood (but not trait) could 
be directly modified by CBM, possible via exposure to valenced materials (Salemink 
et al., 2010a). The present study thus supported this claim that cognitive changes are 
not prerequisites for changes in mood states.  
 The primary implication of this study is that positive interpretation bias can 
be induced in adolescents, including those who have higher levels of vulnerability to 
depression. The latter is particularly remarkable given that these vulnerable 
adolescents were shown to have stronger pre-existing negative interpretation biases. 
Prior to this study, only four CBM studies had been conducted with adolescents. 
These adolescent studies, including the present investigation, do not simply represent 
a replication of the adult literature. Instead, it has been suggested that the role and 
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nature of cognitive biases may vary across different developmental stages (Cole & 
Turner, 1993; Turner & Cole, 1994); therefore, it cannot be assumed that the effects 
of CBM documented in the adult literature would necessarily be applicable to the 
younger populations. Indeed, the neuropsychological findings have lent support for 
the argument that cognitive styles may be more malleable in adolescence than in 
adulthood because of the greater neural plasticity in younger individuals (Blakemore, 
2006).  
From a clinical perspective, adolescence is the developmental stage in which 
the onset rates for anxiety and depression rapidly increase (Gregory et al., 2007; 
Kim-Cohen et al., 2003; Sorenson et al., 1991). More research has been called for to 
develop preventive measures or early interventions for this age group (Sahakian, 
Malloch, & Kennard, 2010). Specifically, research has shown that cognitive biases 
act as a trait vulnerability marker for depression (Chan et al., 2007) and that they are 
predictive for depressive responses to stress in adolescence (Cole & Turner, 1993; 
Turner & Cole, 1994). Therefore, preventive tools focusing on modifying cognitive 
biases, such as the CBM, have a particularly high potential for being beneficial to 
adolescents at risk for developing emotional disorders. It should be noted that, 
although the CBM being studied here targeted interpretation bias, as mentioned in 
the Introduction there is also a CBM programme designed to modify attention biases 
(see Bar-Haim, 2010; Browning et al., 2010; Hakamata et al., 2010 for a review). It 
is beyond the scope of this thesis to compare the effectiveness of the two different 
types of CBM; however, it is noteworthy that previous reports have suggested that 
participants from clinical samples have found the CBM for interpretation more 
engaging and relevant to their problems (e.g., Beard et al., 2011b; Brosan et al., 
2011). This feedback suggested that CBM for interpretation has greater face validity 
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and thus illuminated its potential to be developed as a preventive tool. At the time of 
writing, this study was the first to examine the effects of CBM on adolescents at risk 
for depression by virtue of neuroticism. Despite the limitations discussed above, this 
study represents an important first step in developing preventive tools for 
adolescents at risk for developing emotional disorders. 
The ‘cognitive vulnerability hypothesis’ developed from the cognitive 
theories of depression (Abramson et al., 1989; Beck, 1967; Beck et al., 1979) 
suggests that individuals who exhibit negative cognitive patterns are at increased risk 
for depression particularly when they are confronted with stressful life events. It is 
therefore of the utmost importance that the effects of CBM is tested under 
provocation of stress. However, none of the studies that tested this hypothesis so far, 
including the present investigation, have provided clear evidence to suggest that 
CBM can protect vulnerable individuals against negative emotional and behavioural 
responses upon stress provocation. The lack of convincing evidence for the effects 
on stress vulnerability suggests that CBM is far from ready to be used as a 
preventive intervention. This study also highlighted the need for piloting effective 
ways to record emotional consequences of day-to-day stress, such as using mobile 
phone messages, as well as developing experimental stressors that are tailored to 
provoke clinically-relevant presentations.  
This study echoed the existing literature in suggesting that effects of CBM on 
mood changes were mixed. The pattern of results argued against the hypothesis that 
cognitive changes were mediated by mood. Instead, it illuminates the complexity of 
the mechanisms of change. This study identified training performance as a mediator 
for mood changes, suggesting that engagement and / or amount of positive feedback 
received during training could affect the emotional consequences of training. This 
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study has also tested the hypothesis that neuroticism is a moderator, although the 
current findings have not yielded evidence to support this hypothesis. Previous 
studies have explored other mediators and moderators such as severity of depressive 
symptoms (Lang et al., 2012), level of baseline negative interpretation bias and trait 
anxiety (Salemink & Wiers, 2011), and self efficacy (Lau et al., 2011). However, 
results were patchy and limited by methodological issues. Further research is 
warranted to further clarify the mechanisms of change. 
Finally, although cost-effectiveness has not been formally calculated, this and 
previous research have shown that CBM could be used independently at home or at 
college (e.g., Blackwell & Holmes, 2010; Lang et al., 2011) with minimal input from 
therapists suggesting relatively low costs. This is an obvious advantage for CBM to 
be developed as a preventive intervention. 
 
4.6 Future Research 
 As emphasised in this report, more research is needed to further establish the 
effectiveness of CBM in adolescents. The finding that CBM does not outperform 
placebo-control in most outcome measures suggests that the effects of CBM in 
adolescents are far from robust, and further replication is needed.  Future research 
should address the limitations discussed above. Recruiting participants based on trait 
vulnerability markers, such as neuroticism, family history of depression, or high 
levels of negative cognitive biases, would improve the sensitivity of detecting 
changes that are more clinically relevant. As discussed above, selecting a suitable 
vulnerability marker is itself a challenge; future studies, especially those aiming to 
study the effects of CBM on vulnerability, should consider using a longitudinal 
design with long term follow-up. If the hypothesis that CBM can reduce 
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vulnerability were true, we would predict that the effects could be seen most 
prominently when vulnerable individuals are challenged by stress. Longitudinal 
follow-up with accurate measures of stressful life events would help testing this 
hypothesis. Another way to test this hypothesis is to improve validity of 
experimentally induced stressors. This study has piloted ways to assess responses to 
stress; with further validation, the experimental stressor and the recording of 
responses to day-to-day life stress used in this study could be developed into a robust 
measurement.  
One of the main challenges facing CBM research is that so far there has not 
been compelling evidence that fostering positive interpretations could translate into 
significant benefits for mood and vulnerability. This appears to be one of the major 
obstacles for CBM to be developed as a clinical tool. Although individual studies 
have explained their null results in the context of methodological issues, it is 
important to consider how we may improve the effectiveness of CBM in a broader 
sense. In particular, future research needs to address the negative comments, 
especially ‘boring’, ‘repetitive’, and ‘stereotypical’, and in general to improve 
engagement and compliance to ensure that individuals receive the optimal benefits.  
First, future research could examine whether individually tailored materials 
would produce stronger effects than standardised materials. One way to test this 
hypothesis is to ask participants to rate the extent to which they find the training 
items relevant to themselves. The hypothesis would be supported if the self-
relevance ratings correlated with the size of training effects. Alternatively, 
standardised and individually tailored materials could be directly compared; 
however, this may pose methodological challenges (e.g. it might be difficult to 
match the two conditions in terms of emotional salience). If individualised materials 
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were found to be superior, it would be helpful for researchers or clinicians to work 
collaboratively with each individual to develop the training materials (e.g. making 
use of materials collected through structural clinical interviews or personal diaries). 
Second, the effectiveness of CBM may also depend on the schedule of 
training. Further research is required to examine what the optimal delivery schedule 
is (i.e. whether it should be delivered in an intense way or a small dose per day). 
Although this could be tested through randomised controlled studies, the delivery 
schedule should also be tailored according to individual learning style.  
Furthermore, future research could also explore creative ways to deliver the 
training. The most widely used paradigm so far has been written scenarios that 
required individuals to fill in word fragments. This is not fully accessible to 
individuals who have reading difficulties, the younger age group, or those who 
intellectual disabilities. This is also language-specific, rendering it difficult for CBM 
to be developed as a more universal tool. Some studies used auditory presentations 
(see Table 1.1) which addressed some of these limitations. Future studies could also 
consider using other media such as videos. This study has also demonstrated that 
mobile phones are an acceptable and useful way to engage young people in research; 
future studies could explore whether training could be delivered directly through this 
medium.  
Providing a more explicit rationale for the training may also help 
encouraging individuals to apply what they learn from the CBM training to real life 
situations (Beard, 2011). This process could be facilitated through, for example, 
forming a support group or online forum where CBM users could discuss what they 
learn from the training and how they may transfer their learning to real life.  
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In the longer term, the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of CBM needs to 
be compared with other approaches, such as computerised CBT and other self-help 
interventions, before decisions could be drawn as to whether this could be rolled out 
routinely as a clinical tool.  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
Taken together, this study improved on previous CBM research with 
adolescents by including multiple assessments from baseline to one-week follow-up, 
expanding the range of outcome measures, piloting ways of measuring stress 
vulnerability, and establishing acceptability through the collection of feedback. At 
the time of writing, this study was the first to examine the effects of CBM on 
adolescents with high neuroticism, as well as to explore the potential interaction 
between this personality risk factor and the effects of CBM.  The key findings 
showed that the CBM group showed a greater reduction in negative affect compared 
with control group. In addition, the CBM group did not show the increase in state 
anxiety as seen in Control participants. However, overall this study has not provided 
strong evidence to support the effectiveness of CBM in promoting changes in 
interpretation biases or reducing stress vulnerability in this age group. It is positive 
to note that participants’ feedback was mostly positive suggesting good 
acceptability, although future CBM research needs to prioritise improving upon 
some negative comments such as ‘boring’ and ‘repetitive’. Despite the 
methodological limitations, the present investigation has broadened the hitherto 
narrow evidence base of CBM in adolescent populations. It also represents an 
important step in exploring the potential of CBM to be developed as a preventive 
intervention for vulnerable adolescents. 
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Personality & Thinking 
 
Psychologists at the University of East Anglia would like to invite young people to 
take part in a research project to answer this question: 
 
How does personality affect the way we interpret situations? 
 
 
You must be: 
 Aged 16 years or older 
 Fluent in English, have no severe reading difficulties 
 
 
The study will last for 2 weeks. We will ask you to: 
 Fill in some questionnaires about your mood 
 Do some computer tasks that involve, e.g. completing words 
 
 
To say thank you for taking part, you will be entered into a lucky draw. The winner 
will receive a £100 Amazon voucher. 
 
 
If you would like to take part or would like to find out more about the research, 
please contact Dr Stella Chan (Email: stella.chan@uea.ac.uk).  
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   Personality and Thinking 
Information Sheet for Participants 
Version 2 (19 / 07 / 2011) 
 
Invitation to Participate in the Study 
Thank you for your interest in participating in the study. Before deciding if you want 
to take part, it is important that you understand what this research involves. Please 
take time to read all the information below. If you would find it helpful, you can talk 
to other people about participating in the research. Please feel free to ask us any 
questions. 
 
Purpose of the Research  
In everyday life, we come across a lot of information. People have different styles in 
the way they interpret situations. This may affect the way people think and feel about 
themselves and the world. This research aims to find out how young people with 
different personality characteristics interpret situations, and whether this changes 
over time. 
 
Who is organising the research? 
This research is conducted by Dr Stella Chan, who is currently a Trainee Clinical 
Psychologist at the University of East Anglia (UEA) and has previous experience 
working with young people. She is supervised by Prof Shirley Reynolds, Professor 
of Clinical Psychology and Co-Director of the Doctoral Programme in Clinical 
Psychology. 
 
Who can take part in it? 
We are recruiting young people (aged 16 or above) with different personality 
characteristics to take part. To find out whether you are eligible for the study, we 
will ask you to complete a short questionnaire online. This will only take about 5 
minutes.  
 
Do I have to take part in the research? 
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Taking part in this research is completely voluntary. If you decide to take part, we 
will ask you to sign a consent form to show that you have agreed to participate. You 
are free to change your mind and stop taking part in the research at any time.  
 
What will happen to me if I take part and what will I have to do? 
This study will run across 2 weeks. You will meet with our researcher, in groups, 
three times in total. All meetings will take place at your school during your free time. 
Details are given as follows: 
 
Week 1 
 
Meetings 1 & 2 
You will meet with the researcher twice on two separate days (each about 
1 hour). At each meeting, you will complete 1-3 short questionnaires and 
2 computer tasks. 
 
Week 2 Meeting 3 
During the week after meeting 2, we will contact you via text message or 
email each day and ask you to rate your mood and tell us any events that 
you find particularly cheering or upsetting that day. Towards the end of 
this week, you will meet with the researcher for the third time (about 1 
hour) and complete 3 questionnaires and 1 computer task. We will also 
ask you to give us some feedback about our study. 
 
What are the possible problems or risks if I take part in the research? 
The computer tasks and questionnaires mentioned above have often been used in 
research, so we do not think there will be any problems or risks for you. However, 
you are free to stop participating at any time without having to give a reason. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
This study will help us understand more about how young people think. As a token 
of thanks, you will be entered into a lucky draw for a prize (a £100 Amazon 
voucher) upon completion of the study. 
 
Will my taking part in this research be kept secret? 
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Yes, all the information we collect from you and about you is confidential. All 
information will be anonymised, and kept in a locked filing cabinet in a secure office 
or stored electronically in computers that are password protected. Only the 
researchers will know your name and be able to identify you. The information that 
we collect from you will be looked after by the researchers for 5 years. Then it will 
be destroyed securely by shredding any paper records and permanently deleting 
information held on computer. The findings of the study may be published in 
academic journals or presented in conferences. However your name or other personal 
identifiable information will not be disclosed.  
 
What if there is a problem? 
If you are worried about anything to do with the research or if you have any 
questions, please do not hesitate to contact Stella Chan (Email: 
stella.chan@uea.ac.uk). We will do our best to answer your questions. You may also 
find it helpful to speak with your teachers or parents. If you are still unhappy and 
want to make a complaint, you can contact Prof Shirley Reynolds 
(s.reynolds@uea.ac.uk) who is the supervisor of the researcher.  
 
Who has reviewed the research? 
This research has been approved by the Research Ethics Committee of the University 
of East Anglia (Faculty of Health). This committee is an independent group of 
people who aim to protect your safety, rights, well-being and dignity.  
 
How can I take part in this research or find out more about it? 
If you would like to participate in this research or want to find out more about it, 
please contact Dr Stella Chan by email (stella.chan@uea.ac.uk). Thank you! 
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Personality & Thinking: Screening Questionnaire 
 
If you are interested in taking part in this study, or wish to find out more about it, 
please fill in this questionnaire. This will help the researchers to find out whether 
you are suitable to participate in the study. By completing this questionnaire, you 
will not commit yourself to take part in the study. 
Part I: Basic information, language use, and health 
Name 
 
 
Gender / Age 
 
 
Contact details (email and / or phone number) 
 
 
Is English your first language?  
 
 
Do you consider yourself fluent in English? 
 
 
Do you have severe reading difficulties? 
 
 
Have you ever been diagnosed with a mental 
illness? 
 
 
Part II: Personality Characteristics  
Please answer each question by putting a circle around the “YES” or the “NO” 
following the question. There are no right or wrong answers, and no trick questions. 
Work quickly and do not think too long about the exact meaning of the questions. 
 
PLEASE REMEMBER TO ANSWER EACH QUESTION 
 
Does your mood often go up and down?    YES     NO 
Do you ever feel “just miserable” for no reason?   YES     NO 
Are you an irritable person?      YES     NO 
Are your feelings easily hurt?      YES     NO 
Do you often feel “fed-up”?      YES     NO 
Are you often troubled about feelings of guilt?   YES     NO 
Would you call yourself a nervous person?    YES     NO 
Are you a worrier?       YES     NO  
Would you call yourself tense or “highly-strung”?   YES     NO 
Do you worry too long after an embarrassing experience?  YES     NO 
Do you suffer from “nerves”?     YES     NO 
Do you often feel lonely?      YES     NO 
Thank you very much for filling in this questionnaire, our researcher will contact you 
shortly.
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Participant Identification Number for the Study: ____________ 
 
CONSENT FORM 
Title of Project: Personality and Thinking 
Name of Researchers: Dr Stella Chan, Prof Shirley Reynolds 
     Please initial box 
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet dated 
19.07.2011 (v2) for the above research. I have had the opportunity to consider 
the information, ask questions and receive satisfactory answers. 
 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw 
at any time without giving any reason.  
 
 
3. I agree to take part in the above research. 
 
 
 
 
 
______________________          __________________    _____________________ 
Name of Participant        Date            Signature  
 
 
 
______________________          __________________    _____________________ 
Name of Researcher         Date                                 Signature  
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Feedback Form 
 
Thank you very much for completing the study. We would love to hear how you 
have found the study. This will help us improve our research in the future. 
 
I. How would you describe the study? Please indicate the extent to which you 
agree with each description using the scale from 1 to 5. 
 
 Very 
slightly or 
Not at All 
A Little Moderately Quite a Bit Extremely 
Boring 1 2 3 4 5 
Fun 1 2 3 4 5 
Harmful 1 2 3 4 5 
Interesting 1 2 3 4 5 
Helpful 1 2 3 4 5 
Dull 1 2 3 4 5 
Distressing 1 2 3 4 5 
Pointless 1 2 3 4 5 
II. We are interested to hear what you think the purposes of the computer tasks 
are. Please tick all the categories that you think the computer tasks aim to 
measure. 
Spelling 
 
 
Interpretation of situations 
 
Memory 
 
 
Reading speed 
Concentration  
Others:________________________ 
III. Would you recommend your friends to participate in the study?  Yes / No  
IV. What did you like best about the study? ______________________________ 
V. What did you like least about the study? _____________________________ 
VI. Other Comments: Please tell us anything that you want the Researchers to 
know. 
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Personality and Thinking 
 
Dear Participants, 
  
Thank you again for participating in this study. We truly appreciate your time 
and effort. I hope you have found this an interesting experience. As a token of 
thanks, your name will be entered into a lucky draw for a £100 Amazon voucher at 
the end of the study. 
As we mentioned in the Information Sheet, this study aims to explore how 
young people interpret ambiguous information, and how this may be linked to their 
personality and psychological well-being. The computer tasks we asked you to 
complete were designed to look at your style of interpreting ambiguous information. 
The questionnaires were to help us understand how your mood is in general and how 
it changes on a day-to-day basis.  There were no right or wrong answers in either the 
computer tasks or questionnaires. 
As in many research studies, it is often more helpful to look at your responses 
as a whole group rather than on an individual basis. Therefore, we do not routinely 
give participants individual feedback. However, if you are interested, we will be 
happy to write to you again after the end of the study to tell you what we find. 
Thank you again for your support for our study. Please feel free to contact me 
if you have any questions or concerns. I would like to take this opportunity to wish 
you all the best. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
Dr Stella Chan 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist, University of East Anglia 
Email: stella.chan@uea.ac.uk 
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Dear Participants, 
 
Thank you very much for taking part in the study. I am hoping to come back next 
year and give a talk about the findings of the study, and I hope to see many of you 
there. For the time being, if you have any questions or concerns about the study, 
please contact me. 
 
As you may recall, I asked you to fill in some questionnaires during the sessions. 
They were intended to find out more about your mood and wellbeing at that time. 
Sometimes filling in questionnaires may make people more aware of their feelings. 
If completing the questionnaires has left you with any concerns or questions there 
are a number of places and people whom it might be useful to contact. For example, 
'Centre33' is a local organisation that provides support to young people in 
Cambridge. You can find out more details from their website 
(http://www.centre33.org.uk/). 
 
You might also find that your parents, teachers, college nurse, or GP are able to help. 
 
May I take this opportunity to wish you all the best for Christmas and the year to 
come. 
 
With best wishes, 
Stella 
 
*** 
Dr Stella Chan, Trainee Clinical Psychologist (Email: stella.chan@uea.ac.uk) 
Supervised by Prof Shirley Reynolds, University of East Anglia (Email: 
s.reynolds@uea.ac.uk) 
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Thank you very much for completing Sessions 1 and 2 of the study. From today 
onwards until we meet again next week, I will send you a text message or email each 
day and ask you to answer two questions.   
 
I. First, we will ask you to rate how you feel on each day on a scale of 1 – 5. 
1 = Completely miserable or stressed 
2 = A bit miserable or stressed 
3 = OK 
4 = quite good 
5 = really good 
 
II. Second, we will ask you if there is anything that happened on each day that 
made you feel particularly good or bad. Your answer would be ‘Yes’ or 
‘No’. If your answer is yes, please give a short description (e.g., ‘failed a 
test’, ‘party with friends’, ‘someone gave me a hard time’).  
 
 
THANK YOU! 
 
 
 
